On 5/26/2015 2:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 May 2015, at 06:59, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 26 May 2015 at 05:45, John Clark <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Of that I have no opinion because nobody knows what "comp" means,
least of all Bruno. Comp is the theory that consciousness is the product of
Turing-emulable processes, i.e. that it's a computation.
Actually, that strictly does not follow. All that follows is that a computer can
emulate certain physical processes upon which consciousness supervenes.
In which theory?
This does not mean that consciousness is a computation, in Platonia or anywhere else.
All that we know from the evidence is that consciousness supervenes on physical brains.
Assuming the primitive existence of the physical brain.
That is NOT assumed. All that is *hypothesized* is that consciousness supervenes on a
physical brain. No one said it was "primitive" or "fundamental" nor is that relevant. If
you can show that the physical brain is a consequence of arithmetic, then you will
accomplished a great feat. But it will still be the case that consciousness supervenes on
that brain.
But there is no evidence for that. It is a strong extrapolation, and it failed (since
1500 years) to account for the existence of consciousness. That is why the mind-body
problem is not yet solved.
And what is nice with comp, is that not only computer science does offer a theory of
mind and consciousness, but it explains conceptually the origin of the physical
appearances from elementary arithmetic (and this in a testable way).
But it doesn't. It just says that given comp1, and that comp2 is entailed by comp1, there
must be such an explanation. It's like saying if God created the universe then there's an
explanation for why it's the way it is: God wanted it that way.
Brent
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