On 26 May 2015, at 06:59, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 26 May 2015 at 05:45, John Clark <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]
>> wrote:
Of that I have no opinion because nobody knows what "comp" means,
least of all Bruno. Comp is the theory that consciousness is the
product of Turing-emulable processes, i.e. that it's a computation.
Actually, that strictly does not follow. All that follows is that a
computer can emulate certain physical processes upon which
consciousness supervenes.
In which theory?
This does not mean that consciousness is a computation, in Platonia
or anywhere else. All that we know from the evidence is that
consciousness supervenes on physical brains.
Assuming the primitive existence of the physical brain. But there is
no evidence for that. It is a strong extrapolation, and it failed
(since 1500 years) to account for the existence of consciousness. That
is why the mind-body problem is not yet solved.
And what is nice with comp, is that not only computer science does
offer a theory of mind and consciousness, but it explains conceptually
the origin of the physical appearances from elementary arithmetic (and
this in a testable way).
Bruno
Bruce
The idea that we may one day create AIs is based on the same
assumption. There are a couple of extra assumptions to do with
certain mathematical ideas being correct (e.g. the Church-Turing
thesis, I believe). But I believe it's a fairly standard theory
used by a lot of scientists - Hugh Everett III for example used it
in his thesis.
For clarity I have called this comp1 and Bruno's results derived
from it comp2, but unless someone can show a fault in the argument
connecting them this is a purely nominal distinction.
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