On 28 May 2015, at 12:03, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 26 May 2015 at 16:59, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]
>> wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 26 May 2015 at 05:45, John Clark <[email protected]
Of that I have no opinion because nobody knows what "comp"
means,
least of all Bruno.
Comp is the theory that consciousness is the product of
Turing-emulable processes, i.e. that it's a computation.
Actually, that strictly does not follow. All that follows is
that a
computer can emulate certain physical processes upon which
consciousness supervenes. This does not mean that consciousness
is a
computation, in Platonia or anywhere else. I may have been too
hasty. Comp ("comp1") is the theory that it's the /outcome/ of a
computation, at some level.
All that we know from the evidence is that consciousness
supervenes
on physical brains.
We don't actually know this, although the evidence appears to
suggest it.
On that basis we don't ever know anything!
Yes. Knowing is personal, and the wise stay mute on this. But we can
share our theories or hypotheses. And compare the consequences.
That might well be the case, but science does not operate on such
impossible certainties. We have a working hypothesis that
consciousness supervenes on the physical brain.
Yes, but the most common explanation is based on the facts that at
some level, only elementary relations are involved, making the whole
thing Turing emulable.
Consciousness might then be related to the computation done by the
brain, and not to the physical activity, which is only contingently
related to that computation, at least in some sense.
So far all the evidence supports this hypothesis,
No, the UDA point explains the difficulty. You can associate the 1p
consciousness to a person "run" by some machine, but the person run
itself cannot, unless invoking oracles or infinite amount of
information.
and there is no evidence to the contrary.
The fact that the brain does not seem to use magic, or actual
infinities, can be seen as an evidence for what Liz call comp1, and
then comp1 leads to comp2, by logic + the usual Occam.
That is good enough for the scientist in me.
Because you restrict science to Aristotelian theology. You keep the
scientific attitude in physics, but are unaware of the difficulties of
physicalism in fundamental cognitive science.
But I think the problem is mainly solved, up to the verification which
has to be pursued (forever).
To be short, and ask precision if you want, but the *fact* is that
numbers "dream", relatively to each others, in a precise mathematical
sense (assuming Turing emulability, which entails arithmetical
emulability). Self-correctness make dream cohering with a multi-users
sharable stable universal environment.
Numbers cannot miss the appearances of the observable.
You can, as scientist, understand the theory, before grasping (or
refuting) that it follows logically from computationalism, and
technically from theoretical computer science.
I think that you are not really interested in "philosophy of mind", as
you would perhaps better appreciate the complexity of the subject,
even when using a priori "simplifying" assumption, like
computationalism.
If you have a physical theory of consciousness, which does not borrow
the mathematical theory of computation, please elaborate.
Computationalism is not a threat to physics, only to the metaphysical
assumption that the physical is necessarily the real thing. With comp,
and perhaps even without, evidences accumulate that the physical might
be the border of the "real thing" (which is a mathematical structure
related to the way machine can introspect itself, the universal-
machine mind).
Bruno
Bruce
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