On 28 May 2015, at 14:53, LizR wrote:

On 28 May 2015 at 22:03, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 26 May 2015 at 16:59, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected] >> wrote:

    LizR wrote:

        On 26 May 2015 at 05:45, John Clark <[email protected]

            Of that I have no opinion because nobody knows what "comp"
        means,
            least of all Bruno.
        Comp is the theory that consciousness is the product of
        Turing-emulable processes, i.e. that it's a computation.

Actually, that strictly does not follow. All that follows is that a
    computer can emulate certain physical processes upon which
consciousness supervenes. This does not mean that consciousness is a
    computation, in Platonia or anywhere else.
I may have been too hasty. Comp ("comp1") is the theory that it's the /outcome/ of a computation, at some level. All that we know from the evidence is that consciousness supervenes
    on physical brains.

We don't actually know this, although the evidence appears to suggest it.

On that basis we don't ever know anything!

Are you sure :-)

That might well be the case, but science does not operate on such impossible certainties. We have a working hypothesis that consciousness supervenes on the physical brain. So far all the evidence supports this hypothesis, and there is no evidence to the contrary. That is good enough for the scientist in me.

OK, but scientists are I believe generally agreed that we don't know anything, we only have models, theories etc.

Of course mathematicians may beg to differ.


Are you buying Deustch's wrong idea that mathematicians are not scientists?

Even theologians, when they practice with the scientific attitude, agree that we don't know anything, and have only experiences, theories and interpretations of theories. We bet on a reality when we have faith, but that bet is always personal, and not part of science. But it can be part of the art of medicine, ...

Bruno




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