On 28 May 2015, at 14:53, LizR wrote:
On 28 May 2015 at 22:03, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>
wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 26 May 2015 at 16:59, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]
>> wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 26 May 2015 at 05:45, John Clark <[email protected]
Of that I have no opinion because nobody knows what "comp"
means,
least of all Bruno.
Comp is the theory that consciousness is the product of
Turing-emulable processes, i.e. that it's a computation.
Actually, that strictly does not follow. All that follows is
that a
computer can emulate certain physical processes upon which
consciousness supervenes. This does not mean that consciousness
is a
computation, in Platonia or anywhere else.
I may have been too hasty. Comp ("comp1") is the theory that it's
the /outcome/ of a computation, at some level.
All that we know from the evidence is that consciousness
supervenes
on physical brains.
We don't actually know this, although the evidence appears to
suggest it.
On that basis we don't ever know anything!
Are you sure :-)
That might well be the case, but science does not operate on such
impossible certainties. We have a working hypothesis that
consciousness supervenes on the physical brain. So far all the
evidence supports this hypothesis, and there is no evidence to the
contrary. That is good enough for the scientist in me.
OK, but scientists are I believe generally agreed that we don't know
anything, we only have models, theories etc.
Of course mathematicians may beg to differ.
Are you buying Deustch's wrong idea that mathematicians are not
scientists?
Even theologians, when they practice with the scientific attitude,
agree that we don't know anything, and have only experiences, theories
and interpretations of theories. We bet on a reality when we have
faith, but that bet is always personal, and not part of science. But
it can be part of the art of medicine, ...
Bruno
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