On 26 May 2015, at 18:03, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, May 26, 2015 , LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
> Comp is the theory that consciousness is the product of Turing-
emulable processes
No that's computationalism, "comp" on the other hand is whatever
Bruno says it is, and that changes from day to day as circumstances
demand. I know this because in nearly every post Bruno decrees that
according to "comp" X must be true or according to "comp" Y can not
be true when computationalism says nothing of the sort; so whatever
"comp" is it's not just an abbreviation for computationalism.
This is either
- a confusion between axioms and theorems.
- or an allusion to a flaw, which John Clark has not being able to
explain to anyone. Despite our many effort to get it made clear.
> i.e. that it's a computation. The idea that we may one day create
AIs is based on the same assumption. There are a couple of extra
assumptions to do with certain mathematical ideas being correct
(e.g. the Church-Turing thesis, I believe).
The Church-Turing thesis says something about intelligence but not
consciousness, it says that any real world computation, like a
intelligent action, can be translated into a equivalent program on a
Turing machine.
Church thesis does not invoke ideas of real-world computation, only to
human intuitively computable function.
> But I believe it's a fairly standard theory used by a lot of
scientists - Hugh Everett III for example used it in his thesis.
Everett had no need to say anything about consciousness
It needs computationalism, or at least mechanism. But he uses
computationalism, through the notion of automata. He does not mention
Church-thesis, nor its consequences. Then I show that his theory has
to have redundant.
because unlike most quantum interpretations in Many World's
conscious beings obey exactly the same laws of physics as non
conscious things, so Everett didn't have to explain what a
observation or an observer is. And that is its great strength.
It needs to use computationalism, and so MWI must be extended to all
computations. There is no choice in this matter.
Bruno
John K Clark
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