A small correction: I said "... and the unifying thread is the self-model or ego. This allows for top-down control of attention." What I mean to say is "This allows for a narrative of top-down control". It is not actually clear that there is any such thing as top-down control, although we routinely justify such in the service of maintaining our self models.
On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 11:16 PM, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > Language starts to get in the way here, but what you're suggesting is akin > to someone who is blind-drunk - they will have no memory of their > experience, but I think most would say a blind-drunk is conscious. > > But I think the driving scenario is different in that my conscious > attention is elsewhere... there's competition for the resource of > attention. I don't really think I'm conscious of the feeling of the floor > pressing my feet until I pay attention to it. > > My thinking on this is that human consciousness involves a unified/global > dynamic, and the unifying thread is the self-model or ego. This allows for > top-down control of attention. When parts of the sensorium (and other > aspects of the mind) are not involved or included in this global dynamic, > there is a significant sense in which it does not participate in that human > consciousness. This is not to say that there is no other consciousness - > just that it is perhaps of a lower form in a hierarchy of consciousness. > > I would highlight that human consciousness is somewhat unique in that the > ego - a cultural innovation dependent on the development of language - is > not present in animals. Without that unifying thread of ego, I suggest that > animal consciousness is not unlike our dream consciousness, which is an > arena of awareness when the thread of our ego dissolves. A visual I have is > that in the waking state, the ego is a bag that encapsulates all the parts > that make up our psyche. In dreamtime, the drawstring on the bag loosens > and the parts float out, and get activated according to whatever seemingly > random processes that constitute dreams. > > In lucid dreams, the ego is restored (i.e. we say to ourselves, "*I* *am* > dreaming") - and we "regain" consciousness. > > Terren > > > > > > > > On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 10:10 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Are we any less conscious of as it happens, or perhaps our brains are >> simply not forming as many memories of usual/uneventful tasks. >> >> Jason >> >> >> On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 9:06 PM, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> In the driving scenario it is clear that computation is involved, >>> because all sorts of contingent things can be going on (e.g. dynamics of >>> driving among other cars), yet this occurs without crossing the threshold >>> of consciousness. Relying on some kind of caching mechanism under such >>> circumstances would quickly fail one way or another. >>> >>> Terren >>> On May 27, 2015 7:38 PM, "Pierz" <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, May 28, 2015 at 6:06:22 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 5/26/2015 10:31 PM, Pierz wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Where I see lookup tables fail is that they seem to operate above >>>>>> the probable necessary substation level. (Despite having the same >>>>>> inputs/outputs at the higher levels). >>>>>> >>>>>> But your memoization example still makes a good point - namely >>>>> that some computations can be bypassed in favour of recordings, yet >>>>> presumably this doesn't lead to fading qualia. We don't need anything as >>>>> silly as a gigantic lookup table of all possible responses. We only need >>>>> to >>>>> acknowledge that we can store the results of recordings of computations >>>>> we've already completed, and that this should not result in any strange >>>>> degradation of consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Isn't that what allows me to drive home from work without being >>>>> conscious of it? >>>>> >>>> >>>> People keep making this point, which is one that I myself made in the >>>> past - and I believe you argued with me at the time, saying that it's not >>>> clear that the mechanism for automating brain functions is anything like >>>> the same as caching the results of a computation. I think that objection is >>>> actually fair enough. With automated actions it's not clear that the >>>> computations aren't being carried out any more, just that they no longer >>>> require conscious attention because the neuronal pathways for those >>>> computations have become sufficiently reinforced that they no longer >>>> require concentration. I think this model (automated computation rather >>>> than cached computation) fits our experience of this phenomenon. Sometimes >>>> I suspect we're really talking out of our proverbial arses with these >>>> speculations as we still have so little idea about how the brain works. It >>>> may be a computer in the sense that it is Turing emulable, but then we talk >>>> as if it were squishy laptop or something, and that analogy can be >>>> misleading in many ways. For example, our memories are nothing like RAM. >>>> They are distributed like a hologram, constructive and fuzzy, whereas >>>> computer memory is localised, passive and accurate to the bit. I'm probably >>>> guilty of the same over-zealous computationalism with my lookup table >>>> analogy above, but I was thinking more of an AI and the in-principle point >>>> that cached computation results may be employed at a fine grained level. I >>>> would continue to insist that it is meaningless to say that a "brain" that >>>> employs cached results of computations is a zombie to the extent that it >>>> does so, because it is meaningless to speak of the "when" of qualia. (You >>>> never replied to my argument about poking a recorded Einstein with a stick, >>>> which I think makes a compelling case for this.) We have to rigorously >>>> divide the subjective and the objective. >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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