Language starts to get in the way here, but what you're suggesting is akin to someone who is blind-drunk - they will have no memory of their experience, but I think most would say a blind-drunk is conscious.
But I think the driving scenario is different in that my conscious attention is elsewhere... there's competition for the resource of attention. I don't really think I'm conscious of the feeling of the floor pressing my feet until I pay attention to it. My thinking on this is that human consciousness involves a unified/global dynamic, and the unifying thread is the self-model or ego. This allows for top-down control of attention. When parts of the sensorium (and other aspects of the mind) are not involved or included in this global dynamic, there is a significant sense in which it does not participate in that human consciousness. This is not to say that there is no other consciousness - just that it is perhaps of a lower form in a hierarchy of consciousness. I would highlight that human consciousness is somewhat unique in that the ego - a cultural innovation dependent on the development of language - is not present in animals. Without that unifying thread of ego, I suggest that animal consciousness is not unlike our dream consciousness, which is an arena of awareness when the thread of our ego dissolves. A visual I have is that in the waking state, the ego is a bag that encapsulates all the parts that make up our psyche. In dreamtime, the drawstring on the bag loosens and the parts float out, and get activated according to whatever seemingly random processes that constitute dreams. In lucid dreams, the ego is restored (i.e. we say to ourselves, "*I* *am* dreaming") - and we "regain" consciousness. Terren On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 10:10 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > Are we any less conscious of as it happens, or perhaps our brains are > simply not forming as many memories of usual/uneventful tasks. > > Jason > > > On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 9:06 PM, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> In the driving scenario it is clear that computation is involved, because >> all sorts of contingent things can be going on (e.g. dynamics of driving >> among other cars), yet this occurs without crossing the threshold of >> consciousness. Relying on some kind of caching mechanism under such >> circumstances would quickly fail one way or another. >> >> Terren >> On May 27, 2015 7:38 PM, "Pierz" <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, May 28, 2015 at 6:06:22 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> On 5/26/2015 10:31 PM, Pierz wrote: >>>> >>>> Where I see lookup tables fail is that they seem to operate above >>>>> the probable necessary substation level. (Despite having the same >>>>> inputs/outputs at the higher levels). >>>>> >>>>> But your memoization example still makes a good point - namely >>>> that some computations can be bypassed in favour of recordings, yet >>>> presumably this doesn't lead to fading qualia. We don't need anything as >>>> silly as a gigantic lookup table of all possible responses. We only need to >>>> acknowledge that we can store the results of recordings of computations >>>> we've already completed, and that this should not result in any strange >>>> degradation of consciousness. >>>> >>>> >>>> Isn't that what allows me to drive home from work without being >>>> conscious of it? >>>> >>> >>> People keep making this point, which is one that I myself made in the >>> past - and I believe you argued with me at the time, saying that it's not >>> clear that the mechanism for automating brain functions is anything like >>> the same as caching the results of a computation. I think that objection is >>> actually fair enough. With automated actions it's not clear that the >>> computations aren't being carried out any more, just that they no longer >>> require conscious attention because the neuronal pathways for those >>> computations have become sufficiently reinforced that they no longer >>> require concentration. I think this model (automated computation rather >>> than cached computation) fits our experience of this phenomenon. Sometimes >>> I suspect we're really talking out of our proverbial arses with these >>> speculations as we still have so little idea about how the brain works. It >>> may be a computer in the sense that it is Turing emulable, but then we talk >>> as if it were squishy laptop or something, and that analogy can be >>> misleading in many ways. For example, our memories are nothing like RAM. >>> They are distributed like a hologram, constructive and fuzzy, whereas >>> computer memory is localised, passive and accurate to the bit. I'm probably >>> guilty of the same over-zealous computationalism with my lookup table >>> analogy above, but I was thinking more of an AI and the in-principle point >>> that cached computation results may be employed at a fine grained level. I >>> would continue to insist that it is meaningless to say that a "brain" that >>> employs cached results of computations is a zombie to the extent that it >>> does so, because it is meaningless to speak of the "when" of qualia. (You >>> never replied to my argument about poking a recorded Einstein with a stick, >>> which I think makes a compelling case for this.) We have to rigorously >>> divide the subjective and the objective. >>> >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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