On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 4:04 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > > > A physical body dies... that's part of the riddle. That's true >> regardless of what the status of your personhood is. Only one body leaves >> the sealed room. >> > > If they're identical then the number of bodies is irrelevant, there was > only one person in those 2 sealed rooms before anyone opened a door and > there is only one person in those 2 sealed rooms after one of them opened a > door. Opening a door changed nothing important. > You're treating the room as a black box, but obviously the meat of this thought experiment is what goes on inside the room. > > >> > After duplication the duplicated beings diverge. >> > > If they diverge then they are no longer identical and all bets are off. > And they would only diverge if there were different environmental > conditions in those 2 rooms or if you waited long enough for random quantum > variations to do their work, but that would take a long time. > No duplicator experiment is possible in which the copies don't diverge. The only way they could stay identical after the duplication is if they shared the exact same space and time, but then obviously you haven't duplicated anything. So clearly whatever can said about personhood in a duplicator experiment, must take that divergence into account, despite that the instant after duplication they can be said to be the same person. > > >> > There are two possibilities: translation in space or translation in >> time. For translation in space, the body which is result of the duplication >> (call it JC2) will become manifest in a different physical location than >> JC1 (the original body). >> > > Irrelevant. Subjectively there is no way to know what physical place you > are in unless you are given stimulation of some form the outside world. If > you and "another" identical person were looking at each other in a > symmetrical room and then I instantaneously exchanged your positions > neither you nor the "other" guy would not notice a difference, and a > outside observer would not notice a difference, and even the universe > itself would not notice a difference. If subjectively it makes no > difference and objectively it makes no difference then I think it's safe to > say that it just makes no difference, and in this context the word > "another" has no meaning. > > But that only works if the room is symmetrical. And it's hard to understand why a fact about the room would have any bearing on the identity of the two duplicates. > In fact was I even telling the truth when I said I exchanged the > positions? There would be no way to tell and no reason to care. > But only if the room was symmetrical. If the wall behind me was black and the wall behind my duplicate was white, I would notice instantly if you switched us, or whether you were telling the truth about having done so. > > >> > JC2's experience will feel like entering the duplicator, and then >> suddenly shifting into a new location, >> > > Subjectively it would be instantaneous but objectively the time interval > could have been a nanosecond or it could have been a billion years, but > that's OK because subjectivity is far more important than objectivity; or > at least I think it is. > No problem here. > > >> > whereas JC1 would not experience that. >> > > If the two are identical then their experiences are identical too and so > there is only one experience not two because the experience of John Clark > being alive is a adjective not a noun. Red is a adjective and car is a > noun, if there are 2 red cars there are 2 cars but only one red and if one > car is destroyed red still exists. Right now only one chunk of matter in > the universe behaves in a Johnclarkian way, but in your thought experiment > that is no longer true. > > In no duplication experiment is it even possible in principle for that to be true. You seem to be saying that duplication is impossible. > > For time-translation, JC1 would step out of the duplicator, and then >> some time later (one minute, say), JC2 would become manifest. In which >> case, JC2 would experience walking into the duplicator, and then JC1 >> suddenly popping into view. Whereas JC1 would just experience walking into >> the duplicator, walking out, then watching JC2 appear. >> > > Then they would form different memories and no longer be identical and all > bets are off. I would only be comfortable in having my body destroyed if I > knew a up to date copy of me had been made right now. How long is now? > About a second, maybe two, long enough to have a last thought. And the > thing I personally don't like about death is having a last thought, in your > original thought experiment no thought is interrupted so I don't worry > about opening that door. We don't have thoughts we are thoughts and it > doesn't matter what is thinking them. > > Indeed they would form different memories, as any two copies in a duplication experiment would. If it helps, let's say the door is at the end of a 1000ft hallway and the duplicator is on the opposite end. It will take you and/or your copy a minute to traverse the length. Enough time to begin arguing about which John Clark is going to be the sacrificial lamb. Terren > John K Clark > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
