On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 1:01 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> >> if when that door is opened one of the collection of atoms arranged in >>> a johnclarkian way is disrupted instantaneously, or at least too fast to >>> form a last thought. In that scene from The Prestige one of them DID have a >>> last thought and the other did not, and that last thought was "I am about >>> to die". I don't like any last thought but especially that one. >>> >> >> > What do you mean by "disrupted instantaneously"? >> > > Which word didn't you understand? > I understand them both. I'm just wondering if this is some odd euphemism for physical death. "We're sorry ma'am, but your son was, err, disrupted instantaneously last night." "Heavens, is he alright?" You're still stuck on the time before they diverge, apparently. > > >> > Why would that prevent that johnclarkian collection of atoms from dying >> > > If there are 2 collections of atoms arranged in a johnclarkian way and one > collection is disrupted then there is still something in the universe that > is arranged in a johnclarkian way; and John Clark is an adjective not a > noun, a adjective that still describes something that still exists, so John > Clark still exists, and nothing died. In fact John Clark didn't even notice > it when that one collection of atoms was disrupted. > > Sure, but you're just sidestepping the fact that in the scenario I'm proposing, the two copies will have to work it out which will sacrifice themselves for the benefit of the other. Imagine this is a reality show and while they're going through the ordeal, they are being interviewed for the show. They will have vastly different experiences, especially as they come to an agreement about who will live and who will get "disrupted instantaneously". You better believe the John Clark that walks out the door will notice the other one's sacrifice. > >> If they were no longer identical then they would both have an equal >>> right to call themselves "John Clark" BUT they would no longer be each >>> other, and so in matters of life and death they would both act in their >>> individual self interest just as any 2 people you picked off the street at >>> random would do. >>> >> >> > Yes. So clearly, the two johnclarkian collections of atoms that are no >> longer identical, would have their own thoughts and feelings and act in >> their own self-interest, despite that they would both have equal right to >> call themselves "John Clark". They would both have their own unique >> first-person perspective, their own subjective experience. >> > > Agreed. But that's just what you'd expect in everyday life, even though > they violate no laws of physics matter duplicating machines haven't been > invented yet so today 2 human brains are never even close to being > identical, and that's why I think that version of the thought experiment to > be rather dull. > > As I've said, what makes the thought experiment different from picking any two people is that the two brains would start out as identical. > > we finally get to the point. Since each johnclarkian collection of >> atoms, after they diverge, would have their own unique first-person point >> of view, it's trivial to see how this state of affairs is just like Bruno's >> duplication scenario - after all, in Bruno's experiment both copies diverge >> immediately as well. >> > > No, they remain identical until they open the door of their duplicating > chambers and saw different cities, until they opened those doors there were > 2 bodies but only one individual and he was the Helsinki Man. It was the > sight of Moscow after the door was opened that turned the Helsinki Man into > the Moscow Man and it was the sight of Washington after the door was > opened that turned the Helsinki Man into the Washington Man. > Assuming the duplicating chambers on the destination side were identical in every way, including temperature, light, sound, smell, etc. Which doesn't seem possible, but either way it's not important. If a duplication occurs by uploading John Clark into two identical simulations, that's a different story - there is only one John Clark. But if the simulations were identical in every way, and deterministic in every way, then it could be argued that no duplication ever took place. This is something I think you've argued in the past if I'm not mistaken. > > So why am I the Moscow Man and not the Washington Man? Because I saw > Moscow not Washington. What more needs to be said about it? > > Nothing. > > So next time Bruno brings up '1p', instead of ridiculing the >> terminology, just remember back to this thought experiment and substitute >> the "1p view of Washington man" and "1p view of Moscow man" for the two >> first-person views held by the johnclarkian collections of atoms, so you >> can make sense of what he is saying. >> > > You just said and I agree that there are "two first-person views", and > both people who have those two different first person views remember being > the Helsinki man; so those talking about "THE" future first person view of > the Helsinki Man as if it were singular are talking nonsense. As for > "ridiculing the terminology" well...., from now on I promise to give it all > the respect it deserves. > > Awesome, then I await your take on Step 4. After all, the *one* subjective experience of Helsinki man prior to being duplicated becomes the *two* separate subjective experiences subsequent to that. That gives 1/2 probabilities of Helsinki Man experiencing continuing in either Moscow or Washington. Terren > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
