On 01 Jul 2015, at 03:37, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 11:10:06AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/30/2015 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. No problem with this. But my interest are in consciousness and
qualia, and the advantage of computer science is that it can
handles the computer's truth that the computer cannot communicate,
observe feel, see, etc.
The computer cannot prove some theorems. And it's commonly said
people can't communicate qualia, e.g. perceptions, feelings,
emotions (although we manage at some level). But that doesn't make
(unprovable theorems)= qualia.
No, but it is feasible that qualia are a subset of unprovable
statements. Presumably, computationalism entails that qualia must be
expressible in the language of the machine, and such statements are
either provable (and hence comunicable) or not.
Well technically, qualia, like consciousness and truth are not
expressible in the language of the machine, but they do admit a meta-
definition, and so got a modal logic. qX1* is the theory of qualia,
and quanta appears as particular case (first person sharable). This
entails we share the worlds in the MW, and it makes Everett QM
confirming the falsity of solipsism in comp (which is nice, as we go
very near it with comp).
Keep in mind that all intensional variant of [], with "& p" are not
definable or expressible by the machine. They are all ineffable in the
large sense of the word. But a qualia can be observable, measurable;
etc.
Bruno
Cheers
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Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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