On 30 Jun 2015, at 01:46, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Jun 2015, at 12:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
This then gives the entire universe. The computation may be
repeated many times, but by the identity of indiscernibles, those
repetitions are just the same universe.
Assuming that the limit above is computable, which can hardly be
the case (unless my generalized brain is the entire universe, which
I doubt, but of course, we don't know, although the QM/MWI suggests
empirically that it is not the case).
Your generalized brain has nothing to do with it. We are talking
about computations run by the dovetailer.
Nice. That's equivalent with a tiny part of arithmetic.
And yes, QM in the Everettian interpretation does entail that the
entire universe/multiverse is computable.
If that is the case, then QM is the solution of the measure problem,
and the non computable part is pure global FPI. Our substitution level
would be the level of the uncertainty relation.
But this, we don't know yet, even if the math gives encouraging
direction.
That is what unitary evolution means. As I said:
>> This means that physics is completely computable -- Turing
emulable.
>> But that is what quantum mechanics in the Everettian interpretation
>> tells us. Unitary evolution preserves (quantum) information, and is
>> completely calculable.
OK. No problem with this. But my interest are in consciousness and
qualia, and the advantage of computer science is that it can handles
the computer's truth that the computer cannot communicate, observe
feel, see, etc.
So, it is nice we converge on the same theory, even coming from
different motivation.
>
> Which suggests that the quantum part of QM is part of the winner
> program for the measure, but this remains neutral on the
hamiltonian.
That is covered in what I say below. Different O-regions can have
different Hamiltonians and different initial conditions, but all are
present, and all are completely computable and computed. The
computations may not halt, but that is not a problem when you are
computing universes of potentially infinite duration.
I have no clue how you make prediction with such theory, nor how much
on non-comp you need to make sense of that.
Also, I do not assume QM. I assume only comp, which means that I
assume a reality which is Turing complete, no more.
There will be computations that differ from the one giving this
universe to greater or lesser degrees, so these give neighbouring
universes that differ in these degrees. Actually, this is just the
level 1 multiverse of Tegmark. Given eternal inflation, there are
an infinite number of O-regions (observable universes) sharing our
basic physics. The idea is that there are only a finite number of
possible histories for these O-regions, so any history is repeated
indefinitely often. And for any history, all close and not-so-
close copies are also frequently repeated. This is just what comes
out of the UD as well as these physical theories.
More or less OK.
Computations also exist that correspond to less than complete
universes, or give inconsistent physics, or whatever. The very
limited computation that gives an individual consciousness or
conscious moment is insignificant in the bulk, and because of the
problem of consistent continuations, those "moments" have zero
measure. So we do not have the situation of "reversal", where the
physics is derived from the continuations of these moments. The
physics is given by the extended computations that create entire
observable universe.
But if the physical universe run the UD, to predict (conceptually)
if this apple will fall on the ground, I must look at all
computation going through my current state (where I look at the
apple still in my hands). How would you do? That is obligatory by
the (even just local) FPI.
No, that is the mistake.
OK, but then it must be a mistake somewhere between step 0 and step 6.
If the entire universe is computed infinitely many times,
But what do you mean exactly by that?
then piecemeal bits where we look at computations going through
particular states become irrelevant.
Ah! You mean than in the UD, one program is the winner?
You derive on interesting question, but not a refutation of the
argument.
To solve this we need discuss question like variant of step 6: you are
duplicate in three simulations: one in a virtual Washington, and two
in exactly the same virtual Moscow. What could be P(W) and P(M)?
My approach used tool in logic for not having to decide on this, but
letting the universal machine justifying, or betting, or observing,
etc. With, notably P(x) = 1 when []x & Dt, for x sigma_1.
I do not have to extract physics from this -- physics is already
there in the master computation.
Then you loss the comp occasion to explain the physical from simpler
principles, and you loss the comp explanation of consciousness, and
the test.
Then, also, you betray that you don't even try to listen to the
machines.
Complete, given, and ready to go. All we have to do is explore it
empirically.
Oh! Thank you, God!
Bruce, to me Matter is the most mysterious part of the mind-body
problem. I only formulate the problem to which computationalism is
confronted. You talk like if you were challenging an idea of mine,
when I am the one challenging the conjunction comp + weak materialism.
The little bits have zero measure relative to the whole computation,
so can safely be ignored. No more white rabbits.
Is not the subst. level equivalent to the entire physical universe.
Your brain = the universe. You might need to elaborate, or just prove
what you assert. if you are correct, this would either use non-comp,
or make invalid some step in UDA.
If you can change a bit your negative tone, all the better.
Bruno
Bruce
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