On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 07:08:39PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: > On 6/30/2015 6:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > >On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 11:10:06AM -0700, meekerdb wrote: > >>On 6/30/2015 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>>OK. No problem with this. But my interest are in consciousness and > >>>qualia, and the advantage of computer science is that it can > >>>handles the computer's truth that the computer cannot communicate, > >>>observe feel, see, etc. > >>The computer cannot prove some theorems. And it's commonly said > >>people can't communicate qualia, e.g. perceptions, feelings, > >>emotions (although we manage at some level). But that doesn't make > >>(unprovable theorems)= qualia. > >> > >No, but it is feasible that qualia are a subset of unprovable > >statements. Presumably, computationalism entails that qualia must be > >expressible in the language of the machine, and such statements are > >either provable (and hence comunicable) or not. > > > >Cheers > > > > But there are an infinite number of unprovable propositions. Are we > to suppose that all of them are qualia?
No - I don't think that was ever suggested. What qualia is, "Peano > arithmetic is consistent"? If many unprovable propositions are not > qualia then we need some additional discriminant and the "hard > problem" is not solved. > I don't think Bruno ever claimed that the hard problem is solved. What he is suggesting is that studying the set of unprovable propositions will tell you something about qualia. This is a much more modest claim. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
