On 03 Jul 2015, at 01:35, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Jul 02, 2015 at 12:04:46PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Jul 2015, at 03:33, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 07:14:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Jun 2015, at 01:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
My conclusion is that, overall, his arguments do not entail the
conclusions he seeks to draw.
So yes, I seek to defeat his 'proofs', not necessarily to prove
the contrary.
Ok, but I honestly think that you failed.
At step 7, you, yourself, admit that physicality, or
"concreteness" of
the primitive ontology has no bearing on phenomenal reality.
I am not sure I understand why you say this. At step seven, I still
accept the idea that perhaps a concrete ontological physical
universe is needed for comp to enact consciousness. We get the
reversal, but only assuming he robust physical universe. We can
conclude and stop here with some strong Occam razor.
OK, to be more precise - when I say "at step 7", I mean "after step
7", or "conclude by step 7". But given your responses below, I think
you got this.
You
haven't proven immateriality, just that the primitive physicality
is an
unnecessary assumption.
At step seven yes.
You need to wield Occam's razor to eliminate
primitive physicality.
At step seven? A strong one, yes.
I might be happy with this, but perhaps Bruce isn't.
Step 8 doesn't address this issue at all, as it seems inapplicable
to
a robust universe.
Step 8 eliminates the need to assume the robust universe to get the
reversal.
Step 8 shows that a robust universe, if it plays any role related to
consciousness, give matter non Turing emulable properties, making
comp false.
?? A robust universe is compatible with COMP.
No more after step 8. More exactly: the use of a robust universe to
prevent the reversal cannot been made. People can still believe in a
robust physical universe, but can no more related it to first person
experience, making such a universe having no role even in only the
physical observable.
Did you mean "concrete
universe" (aka primitive physical ontology)?
Yes. And the fact that such a universe is supposed to be necessary for
consciousness to exist.
If primitive matter plays a non Turing emulable role, I
can no more be sure that the doctor can get the subst level right.
Step allows to conclude to non-physicalism, using now just the usual
weak occam razor used in amy applied science.
I follow you there. But I think Bruce doesn't accept the use of
Occam's razor that way.
After step seven, before step 8, that could make sense. But after step
8, the use of Occam razor is very weak, it consists not just in
abandoning a redundant hypothesis/ontological commitment, but a
useless one, that we cannot related to any experience. It is weaker
than the abandon of the collapse of the wave in QM.
Let me put it another way - Bruce do you accept Laplace's "je n'ai
besoin de cet hypothese" when talking about God?
Except that with comp it is stronger: it is "je ne sais pas utiliser
cette hypothèse" (I cannot use the hypothesis). Of course, we can
argue that with God, Laplace cannot use that hypotheses too. But that
is less clear than the inability to use primitive matter when we
assume to survive "qua computatio".
Bruno
Cheers
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Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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