On 29 Jun 2015, at 19:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/29/2015 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Jun 2015, at 12:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Jun 2015, at 01:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Jun 2015, at 04:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jun 2015, at 14:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
My contention is that the body (and the rest of the world)
is essential for a satisfactory account of personal identity.
I can understand, but that remains possibly true
phenomenologically. Unless you explain me why you use your
theory to refuse a brain transplant to a kids who will die
without?
A brain transplant means replacing one physic brain with
another physical brain. I think you need to explain why we
need a transplant -- why not just replace the brain with the
appropriate universal number tattooed on the forehead?
because in that case (admitting some sense in it) would not
save your relative manisfestation locally.
Personal identity is not just a matter of memories.
Right, and that is clear from the AUDA definition. But for UDA,
personal memory is enough to get the reversal.
You have not *derived* any reversal at any stage -- you have
only ever asserted or assumed it.
The reversal follows logically from COMP + ROBUST-UNIVERSE at
step seven. If not, ask me what you don't understand.
The trouble is that there is a simpler and more believable
interpretation of the UD available. Let us go to a robust universe
or, more particularly, the UD as run in Platonia or arithmetic.
At step seven, we use the concreteness of the UD. But let us see.
You say that this then runs all possible computations and, indeed,
runs any finite computation indefinitely often.
It runs also the infinite computations infinitely often. OK.
Let us accept this for the moment.
This is provable. But OK.
Then there is a computation that instantiates the entire
observable universe, from the big bang to indefinitely far into
the future.
Not necessarily. The observable is eventually given by the limit on
all non stopping computations, and that limit might be computable,
or not. We don't know what is the case.
If the UD runs all "infinite computations and infinitely often" then
in what sense can it fail to compute the limit?
The limit is phenomenological, and is an undeterminacy on a complex
structure. It include all oracles, in some sense. We just don't know
if that limit is computable or gives a computable winner.
I do agree, yet, that all computations approximating the physical
universe are run by the UD.
This then gives the entire universe. The computation may be
repeated many times, but by the identity of indiscernibles, those
repetitions are just the same universe.
Assuming that the limit above is computable, which can hardly be
the case (unless my generalized brain is the entire universe, which
I doubt, but of course, we don't know, although the QM/MWI suggests
empirically that it is not the case).
There will be computations that differ from the one giving this
universe to greater or lesser degrees, so these give neighbouring
universes that differ in these degrees. Actually, this is just the
level 1 multiverse of Tegmark. Given eternal inflation, there are
an infinite number of O-regions (observable universes) sharing our
basic physics. The idea is that there are only a finite number of
possible histories for these O-regions, so any history is repeated
indefinitely often. And for any history, all close and not-so-
close copies are also frequently repeated. This is just what comes
out of the UD as well as these physical theories.
More or less OK.
Computations also exist that correspond to less than complete
universes, or give inconsistent physics, or whatever. The very
limited computation that gives an individual consciousness or
conscious moment is insignificant in the bulk, and because of the
problem of consistent continuations, those "moments" have zero
measure. So we do not have the situation of "reversal", where the
physics is derived from the continuations of these moments. The
physics is given by the extended computations that create entire
observable universe.
But if the physical universe run the UD, to predict (conceptually)
if this apple will fall on the ground, I must look at all
computation going through my current state (where I look at the
apple still in my hands). How would you do? That is obligatory by
the (even just local) FPI.
In this situation, physics is to be done in the usual way --
observation, experimentation and the development of corrigible
theories.
Nobdiy will ever arguye that experiemental physics should be done
in other ways. Theoretical physics and fundamental physics will
change but just by elimination of redundant hypotheses, and by the
abandon of primary matter (sometimes already abandoned by
physicists themselves).
"Questioning the machine" will never go anywhere because finite
continuations of local conscious calculations are not sufficiently
coherent.
On which view? That is true for []p, but false for []p & <>t.
Are you saying that it is true that all provable propositions are
not sufficiently coherent to instantiate a consciousness? But the
set of provable propositions with the added axioms of consistency are?
I don't say that. What happens is that the correct representation of
the subject to the subject is unable to prove neither its consistency,
still less its correctness (that he is even unable to define). That is
why the machine looking inward cannot miss the difference between []p
and []p & p, or []p & <>t. They obey different logic, even if G* prove
that they "see" or access to the same part of the arithmetical.
[]p is enough coherent, if you want, but it cannot know that.
Are you not suffering of some Dunning-Kruger symptoms? If you have
a proof that finite continuations of local conscious calculations
are not sufficiently coherent, then you could refute comp. Do it,
then.
I think Bruce is saying that you don't have a proof that they are
sufficiently coherent
?
I interview only correct machine, by construction. They are
consistent. But they cannot know it. may be this explains the confusion.
and so comp doesn't entail the reversal.
You don't need the math, unless you can use it to present a comp
physical theorem violated by nature. But the propositional logic of
the observable, in fact three of them, are verified by the know
quantum facts.
QM and Gödel conspires for making comp very hard to refute.
His argument is a defeater of a proof, not a proof of the contrary.
But it is not valid as I understand it, beyond being not quite clear
(what could mean "enough consistent", or "enough coherent"?).
The incredible "miracle" is that adding the 'explicitation of
consistency, and thus transforming a belief logic into a measure of
uncertainty provides the quantization, giving the possibility of the
the quantum "coherence".
Just abstracting from the cul-de-sac world (adding the consistency <>t
= ~[]f) by adding to the formula the (relative) consistency condition
<>t, seems to linearize and quantize, and probably symmetrize, the
bottom core of the physical reality.
When known modal logic, this is a miracle, as Grz imposes antisymmetry
on the finite models, and B (from the material hypostases) imposes
symmetry, making it like S4Grz1, Z1, and X1 should collapse, but the
nuance brought by the incompleteness phenomenon just makes this not
happen, and provide an intuitionist subject enveloped by a physical
boundary.
And we get what the physicists are not so interested in, the
distinction between the communicable and the non communicable parts,
like the distinction of quanta and qualia. Non communicable is for
~[], for any boxes representing some points of view or hypostases.
It is not my theory, it is the theory of the universal machine, when
knowing its universality (like PA, ZF, ...), and looking inward
avoiding lying to herself (and eternal temptation, with comp).
Bruno
Brent
It is only within the larger computation that any consistent
physics can emerge.
The infinitely many one, yes, but this works only if it wins the UD
measure, and change nothing in the fact that physics is determined
by the measure on all computations.
This means that physics is completely computable -- Turing
emulable. But that is what quantum mechanics in the Everettian
interpretation tells us. Unitary evolution preserves (quantum)
information, and is completely calculable.
Which suggests that the quantum part of QM is part of the winner
program for the measure, but this remains neutral on the hamiltonian.
You have difficulty extracting physics from your theory because
you are looking in the wrong place.
The point is independent of the extraction. The UDA point is that
the extraction exists, and can be find by interviewing the machine.
Then, I don't know to which difficulty you allude too.
On the contrary I am amazed of what is already derived.
Now, I am not claiming that the above outline is correct, or that
I even believe it. But it is a more coherent interpretation of the
scenario you paint through the UDA than the arguments you give.
I have not seen your point. The reversal still occurs at step 7,
assuming a primitive robust universe. If the entire physical
universe is computable, you still need to prove this and justify
its winning measure ability to solve the mind-body problem.
Given that there are alternative, more plausible interpretations
of the idea that all computations are present in arithmetic, I do
not feel in the least constrained to accept your particular view.
Nice try, but you made statements without proof (see above), and I
don't see where in your argument you compare the comp predictions
and the empirical predictions, except by your invocation of a "real
physical universe", which begs the question and use implicitly some
non Turing emulable ability of matter to select a computation.
Bruno
Bruce
Then in step 8, the assumption "ROBUST-UNIVERSE" is replaced by
the usual weak form of Occam razor, as we can never prove
something about reality without invoking it.
Why don't you ask question instead of talking like you find a
flaw? If you find a flaw tell us precisely in which step please.
Apparently you still have a problem with step 7, before MGA, as
there is a reversal at step seven. Don't you see it? How do you
predict the result of an experience of physics in step 7?
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