On 05 Jul 2015, at 20:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/5/2015 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You forget that we want to solve the mind-body problem (called
nowadays "the hard problem of consciousness", but with comp the
cpnsciousness part is easy,
I don't see that it's easy. I don't see much connection between what
is provable in arithmetic my stream of narrative consciousness;
except when I think about proofs of arithmetic.
I guess you mean "Peano Arithmetic" by "arithmetic". PA is a Löbian
machine, and what PA proves = what PA believes, since I take the
intentional stance (like Dennett). This is related to the discourse of
*any* machine believing in the truth of elementary arithmetic or
Turing equivalent. Consciousness is then related to the instinctive
inference of self-consistency, or in any reality. You can approximate
by something like "consistent(p) or true(p)", the dual of the []p & p,
or by "consistent(p) or provable(f)", the even more "trivial" dual of
[]p & <>t. It gives a logic of qualia (close to one suggested by J.L.
Bell). With the " & <>t" nuance, we lost the transitivity of [], which
is perfect for the kind of immediate prediction we are concerned with,
and it separate also the logic from its starred image (like G versus
G*) which explains the difficulties that the machine is confronted
when liking qualia to possible quant, which here appears as particular
case of qualia.
What is easy in this theory, and remain unexplained in most other
theory, is why the logic of the first person are so different from the
logic of the third person, and includes some truth which seems
completely obvious from the 1p view, despite being incommunicable or
non justifiable in the 3p way, which are known to lead to the
complexity of the problem. In the long french text, I use this to put
some light on problems in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I
show notably that Malcolm's argument against the existence of dreams
is isomorphic to his argument against mechanism.
Again, the main point is that there is no choice in the matter.
Everything is derived from computationalism, and I am open to other
theories. Physicists does not address the problem at all, and
sometimes seems to be unaware of it, or seems to just dismiss it.
Bruno
Brent
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