On 03 Jul 2015, at 14:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Jul 2015, at 02:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:
In the context of the present discussion, I would say that UDA+MGA
does not entail immaterialism.
Logically no. Episitemologically, yes. Primitive matter becomes a
phlogiston or ether sort of thing. We cannot detect it, we cannot
use it, we cannot related to any experience in physics, etc. yes,
logically we can still believe in it. I have never pretended the
contrary. (I admit that in some text, I might be quick on this).
My point is that whatever metaphysical stance you take, the physical
universe exists,
I agree.
and our experience of it is the basis of all our knowledge.
I disagree. I mean that a lot of our human knowledge comes from the
physical reality, but I do think that a lot of our knowledge comes
also from the mathematical reality, notably through the physical
implementation of universal machine, which can explore the
mathematical reality.
It is quite possible to accept primary physicality and interpret
the universe in a pancomputationalist framework.
No. This does not work. Everything cannot be computable, once we
are turing emulable.
I have never understood why you say this. Given that the world is
explicable in terms of regular physical laws, then it is computable.
Unitary evolution of the wave function is a prime example of this.
The only problem might be that that laws of physics do not
necessarily give the boundary values. But multiverse models
eliminate even this difficulty.
Yes, but multiverse and multidreams introduce the FPI, which adds an
element on non computability in the predictions.
Indeed, the problem is that intuitively, with computationalism, that
non-computability might be too much great, and predicts white noise
our aberrant histories. Then computer science shows that there are
theoretical constraints, like self-referental correctness which put
big constraints, and so computationalism is not (yet) refuted.
Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain, or physical computer
if required.
That is shown impossible, unless you redefine "brain" by the quotient
equivalence of all computations going through my actual state.
In either case, it obeys regular laws, so is computable.
Above the substitution level. I cannot predict all the details, due to
either the Heisenberg limit, or the comp limit (wich might be the
same, or not).
If you interpretation of the UDA leads to non-computability, then
that itself is a strong argument against comp because it would imply
that some behaviour in the universe is not law like.
Yes, but it can still be no more than the non predictability near the
Heizenberg limit.
The universe is then understood in terms of computations, but
these are a consequence, secondary and not primary.
That seems self-contradictory to me. If computations are secondary,
why explain the universe in term of them?
Any physical model is secondary, yet we routinely explain things in
terms of such models.
Keep in mind that I am interested in the mind-body relation.
Computationalism suggest the brain is a machine, and in that case it
becomes both a sort of theory and an object of the theory.
If you don't commit yourself ontologically in favor of a primitive
universe, I don't see why you could have any problem with what I
deduce from comp.
Computation is a purely mathematical, even arithmetical notion.
Without giving a theory which would be able to just give a physical
definition of computation (not using the arithmetical one) I can
not make sense of your proposition.
I don't know why you think that a separate physical definition would
be necessary. Mathematics is derived from physics, and so is
computation.
Mathematics is not derived from physics, and physicists assumes some
amount of mathematics.
Human mathematician might come in a big part from the physical world,
but the object of mathematics is not physical. With comp, the object
of mathematics, and physics (the science), are creation of the mind of
universal machine(s). Then the consequence is that the very object of
physics emerge from the universal machines relations in arithmetic. An
infinity of them, by the FPI.
In the theory logic +
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
there is no physical assumptions.
Bruno
Bruce
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