On 04 Jul 2015, at 03:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Jul 2015, at 14:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
In fact, some would say that "it is models all the way down".
I have no idea what you mean by model. But keep in mind that
logicians used it as the possible interpretation of a theory. A
theory is seen as a syntactical machine-like device to produce
theorems? A model is a structure which satisfies (interpret) those
axioms and theorems of the theory.
Yes. A word like 'model' can have many meanings in different
contexts. Physicists tend to use the term somewhat loosely to mean
anything from a simplified situation (toy model, as in 2-dimensional
gravity models) to a fully developed theory. They are less likely to
use the term in the sense of 'exemplar', as in 'a model of rectitude!'
We ultimately have nothing but models that must constantly be
subject to revision in the light of new or more evidence.
Yes, I agree with this (using models meaning theory).
The idea that we can interpret the data without using theory is due
to the facts that most of our theory are instinctive and wired up
in our brain. Without a theory, all data does not make sense. We
instinctively bet in our existence and in the existence of some
reality. That is already a theory (model, for physicists). Indeed,
it is already a theology (a part of it becomes false when assumed).
Physics is well aware that all observation is theory laden. Much of
this is hard-wired in our brains by evolution, but there is also a
real sense in which newborn babies have to learn how to observe and
interpret the world around them, developing their own models and
theories of the world.
No problem.
I am still waiting for your assessment of the six first steps of
the UDA, so that we can discuss step 7 and step 8 at ease.
In brief, it seems that the early steps are about developing a
theory in which consciousness can be split up into moments that are
integrated over to make up the continuous experience, memory being
the linking feature. This is a preparation for interpretation of the
realization of existence in the UD.
The theory is the common sense assumption that not only we can survive
with a pump at the place of the heart, but that we can survive with a
computer in place of the body, or put in another way, that the brain/
body is Turing emulable (locally).
I just formulate (and I guess partially solve, in that frame) the mind-
body problem. I show how to test the solution, and thus the
computationalist frame.
I am not defending or attacking anything. I am just interested in the
"consciousness/matter" problem.
I have problems with the one-dimensional 'model' of personal
identity that is used here.
Where? Which step. Please be precise enough so that I can see if you
make a point or just bad philosophy.
Personal identity is multi-dimensional, and identity over time is a
complicated function of these dimensions. Something important seems
to be lost with hanging everything on memory.
We don't hang on memory. But any 1p notion verifying those memory
relation are enough to get the consequence. I give a proof, thanks to
the miracle that comp makes possible to do the math.
Also, the first person perspective merges into the third person
perspective imperceptibly as we include awareness of our bodies and
surroundings. Pure introspection will never get us anywhere.
If we apply the greek classical definition, all self-referentially
correct machine have a soul, which does play some role in the
selection of the physical laws and the physical selection.
Even if shown wrong, comp is enough to make your extrapolation invalid.
You need to do some amount of intropection to get the mind-body problem.
So you just tell me, the mind-body problem does not interest me.
OK. But then be careful in making negative statement about theories
which handle that problem.
However, once you move the dovetailer into Platonia, these early
stages of the argument do not establish anything significant. (See
below.)
OK. This mean you do get comp = step 0, and comp -> step 1, step 1 ->
step 2, ... up to step 6 at least.
It seems to me that you did understand step seven, as you got the
point by yourself once (and present it as a problem for comp, but
you ignored that that was the point). The UDA *is* a problem for
the computationalist: to eliminate the white rabbits, or
equivalently to justify the laws of physics.
You have not really responded to my suggestion that the laws of
physics, and the elimination of white rabbits, are already implicit
in the UD -- we just go to the computation that computes the whole
universe, from its inception to indefinitely in the future.
That is what need to be justified, if that exists. How would such
"multiple-unique" physical universe number win the competition? You
can say; well, it did it as we can see. OK. But comp says you can find
it in your head, and then we can compare.
If we consider only distinguishable histories, this is a finite
computation up to any given epoch, so is necessarily present in the
dovetailer. Why not use it?
We certainly use it. Even nature use it. The interesting things is to
derive this from the needed self-reference made in UDA, so that we can
test the comp explanation of mind, and of body.
There is then no difficulty in extracting physics -- it is just
there, complete.
OK, but with comp we get a bigger picture, and what we observe and
feel (the physical) is the limit-border of something "bigger" (despite
smallaer than what we are used to assume in science). That "bigger"
thing being the sigma_1 (computable) reality.
This might not explain anything beyond that which is explained by
the assumption of primitive physicality, but then, I don't think
that comp actually does explain anything, anyway.
Comp is the assumption that there is no little daemon playing
infinite, non Turing emulable, magic in the brain. It is a common
hypothesis, and belongs to the "Mechanist" tradition, that Diderot, in
France, associates with the rationalist tradition.
And I show a problem, which is that we have to justify the appearance
of matter from the number relations, through the arithmetical
indexicals (the hypostases) if we want to get light on the mind-body
problem.
I am not someone coming with any new theory. All cognitive sciences
uses comp, except the one by Penrose. But Hamerov, very close to
Penrose, is already under the constraints of computationalism, as the
reasoning does not depend on the level.
Then AUDA works not just for machine, but foir hyper-machines, and a
large varities of gods, defined by non computable set of true
arithmetical propositions. "true" means satisfied in the structure (N,
+, *).
The ontological commitment toward a primitive physical reality
simply does no more work after step 8 (MGA, or Maudlin).
Step 8 and the MGA do not prove anything.
What is wrong, specifically?
Bruno
Bruce
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