On 03 Jul 2015, at 02:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
Let me put it another way - Bruce do you accept Laplace's "je n'ai
besoin de cet hypothese" when talking about God?
I understand what Laplace means, but I also think that not even
Laplace would claim that this entails the non-existence of God.
OK.
But in science we can never prove anything on reality. But we can
prove that something is redundant, or useless in the context of
accepting some theory. A bit like the SWE+comp makes the collapse
useless, which is nice as it contradicts or limits the use of the SWE.
In other words, he might not need to hypothesize a god in order to
explain the operation of his mechanistic universe. But God might not
be an explanatory hypothesis, it might play a different role.
But that is what people fail to give: a role to primitive matter, or
even just a mean to make sense of it. Once we assume computationalism,
observation is lost for that role.
The real point is that Occam's razor, in any form, is not a truth-
preserving inferential rule.
Indeed, it is not a rule of logic. It is a rule of inductive inference.
Consequently, if the razzor is used in an argument, you cannot claim
that the premises entail the conclusion.
You can't, unless you do applied (to reality), where it is the only
mean available. But it is not a proof. When I say that comp implies
immaterialism, I am in the applied context, and I suppose (or make
precise) that people know that in science, we don't have proof: only
working theories, avoiding making them complex just to retain an
ontological commitment. I say often that MGA shows that the notion of
matter is made into a god-of-the-gap. But it is more than that, as
such primitive matter is shown to be not possibly related to
consciousness in any possible ways not contradicting comp.
It is just an arbitrary choice on your part to read things one way
rather than another.
Not at all, the point of step 7 and 8 is to show that it is not
arbitrary at all.
In the context of the present discussion, I would say that UDA+MGA
does not entail immaterialism.
Logically no. Episitemologically, yes. Primitive matter becomes a
phlogiston or ether sort of thing. We cannot detect it, we cannot use
it, we cannot related to any experience in physics, etc. yes,
logically we can still believe in it. I have never pretended the
contrary. (I admit that in some text, I might be quick on this).
It is quite possible to accept primary physicality and interpret the
universe in a pancomputationalist framework.
No. This does not work. Everything cannot be computable, once we are
turing emulable.
The universe is then understood in terms of computations, but these
are a consequence, secondary and not primary.
That seems self-contradictory to me. If computations are secondary,
why explain the universe in term of them?
Computation is a purely mathematical, even arithmetical notion.
Without giving a theory which would be able to just give a physical
definition of computation (not using the arithmetical one) I can not
make sense of your proposition.
Bruno
Bruce
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