On 7/3/2015 8:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Jul 2015, at 14:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Jul 2015, at 02:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:
In the context of the present discussion, I would say that UDA+MGA does not entail
immaterialism.
Logically no. Episitemologically, yes. Primitive matter becomes a phlogiston or ether
sort of thing. We cannot detect it, we cannot use it, we cannot related to any
experience in physics, etc. yes, logically we can still believe in it. I have never
pretended the contrary. (I admit that in some text, I might be quick on this).
My point is that whatever metaphysical stance you take, the physical universe
exists,
I agree.
and our experience of it is the basis of all our knowledge.
I disagree. I mean that a lot of our human knowledge comes from the physical reality,
but I do think that a lot of our knowledge comes also from the mathematical reality,
notably through the physical implementation of universal machine, which can explore the
mathematical reality.
It is quite possible to accept primary physicality and interpret the universe in a
pancomputationalist framework.
No. This does not work. Everything cannot be computable, once we are turing
emulable.
I have never understood why you say this. Given that the world is explicable in terms
of regular physical laws, then it is computable. Unitary evolution of the wave function
is a prime example of this. The only problem might be that that laws of physics do not
necessarily give the boundary values. But multiverse models eliminate even this difficulty.
Yes, but multiverse and multidreams introduce the FPI, which adds an element on non
computability in the predictions.
Indeed, the problem is that intuitively, with computationalism, that non-computability
might be too much great, and predicts white noise our aberrant histories. Then computer
science shows that there are theoretical constraints, like self-referental correctness
which put big constraints, and so computationalism is not (yet) refuted.
Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain, or physical computer if
required.
That is shown impossible, unless you redefine "brain" by the quotient equivalence of all
computations going through my actual state.
In either case, it obeys regular laws, so is computable.
Above the substitution level. I cannot predict all the details, due to either the
Heisenberg limit, or the comp limit (wich might be the same, or not).
If you interpretation of the UDA leads to non-computability, then that itself is a
strong argument against comp because it would imply that some behaviour in the universe
is not law like.
Yes, but it can still be no more than the non predictability near the
Heizenberg limit.
The universe is then understood in terms of computations, but these are a
consequence, secondary and not primary.
That seems self-contradictory to me. If computations are secondary, why explain the
universe in term of them?
Any physical model is secondary, yet we routinely explain things in terms of
such models.
Keep in mind that I am interested in the mind-body relation. Computationalism suggest
the brain is a machine, and in that case it becomes both a sort of theory and an object
of the theory.
If you don't commit yourself ontologically in favor of a primitive universe, I don't see
why you could have any problem with what I deduce from comp.
Computation is a purely mathematical, even arithmetical notion. Without giving a
theory which would be able to just give a physical definition of computation (not
using the arithmetical one) I can not make sense of your proposition.
I don't know why you think that a separate physical definition would be necessary.
Mathematics is derived from physics, and so is computation.
Mathematics is not derived from physics, and physicists assumes some amount of
mathematics.
Or they learned from experience in the school of natural selection.
Brent
Human mathematician might come in a big part from the physical world, but the object of
mathematics is not physical. With comp, the object of mathematics, and physics (the
science), are creation of the mind of universal machine(s). Then the consequence is that
the very object of physics emerge from the universal machines relations in arithmetic.
An infinity of them, by the FPI.
In the theory logic +
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
there is no physical assumptions.
I'm glad to hear you say that. In the past you've asserted that Ey means something named
y exists.
Brent
Bruno
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