On 18 Aug 2015, at 23:19, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the
1p.
>> What! So whatever really does happen to Bruno Marchal
after the duplication there will be no 1p?
> Why would I ask you to predict the 1p if there were none?
No idea, but John Clark is not required to explain Bruno Marchal
's actions.
> Why do you say this?
Because the only way John Clark knows how to interpret " "What
does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p" is that the
1p does not happen after duplication in which case John Clark has no
idea what "1p" means.
No the 1p happens in the two places. When I say that the question is
about the 1p, it means the content of the 1p. That is a subjective
happening. Other post have shown you did understand this, so again I
have that feeling that you are just playing with word, or just doing
the stable confusion between, the 3-1p, and the 1p itself.
>>After the duplication Bruno Marchal will have no
subjective experience??
> After duplication, both copies will have a (single, definite)
subjective experience.
And BOTH are Bruno Marchal from their subjective point of
view.
Sure.
John Clark makes no claim that either of them is or is not "you"
because John Clark does not know what one and only one thing that
personal pronoun means in a world with "you" duplicating machines.
You omit that after the duplication, both know very well who they are,
and computationalism entails it can only be W, or M.
The guy in Helsinki knows that in advance, and so can predict P(W v M)
= 1, and P(W & M) = 0.
(Where W and M refer to the 1p experiences, not the 3p description of
those experiences (the 3-1p).
> We assume comp, remember?
I don't assume "comp", remember?
Sorry, but you accepted the step 0 and the step 1, which means that by
definition you assume or accept computationalism (abbreviated by comp).
> Rhetroical trick. comp is computationalism. By definition.
Usage is always more important that definitions.
Not in science.
I don't care about your homemade definition of your homemade baby
talk word, I care about your usage of the word, and from usage I
conclude that "comp" has little or nothing to do with
computationalism.
Because you put step 3 in comp, but step 3 is not part of comp. You
just confuse people with this.
> It is up to you to show what is gibberish.
It is up to you to show which of the 2 people after the
duplication who go by the name of "you" is THE One True YOU, the
only "you" that is relevant in determining if the prediction made in
Helsinki was correct or not.
This is ridiculous. There are no TRUE you, or if you prefer the TRUE
you is at BOTH places. But comp entails that BOTH feels to be at one
place, and this makes the probability calculus easy.
But of course prediction, correct or incorrect, have nothing to do
with consciousness or the continuous feeling of personal identity.
Of course, but 100% irrelevant.
>> if we asked "what will happen to Ed after the duplication?"
then that question would not be gibberish and if Ed were rational Ed
could correctly answer it.
> "What will happen" in this context is ambiguous. It can mean
"what will happen from the 1p view", or "what will happen from the
3p view".
To hell with viewing peepee!
See below.
To avoid ambiguity after the duplication simply ask the man, or
rather the men, "are you Ed?" and if they say "yes" that that ends
the matter, they are Ed. Therefore if Ed were rational back in
Helsinki Ed would predict that Ed would see Moscow AND Ed would see
Washington. And Ed's prediction would turn out to have been correct.
Ed is in W and Ed in M is not the same as Ed feels to be in W and in M.
For the billionth time, you give me the correct 3-1 prediction, but
the question is about the future 1p that you will live, and that
future 1p does not, with P = 1, contain the W & M experience.
By saying the "hell with viewing peepee", is like saying "the hell
with the question you asked", but then why take some much pain in
criticizing the answer I give to that question if you are not
interested in that question.
However after the duplication if Bruno Marchal asked John Clark
"are you you in the 1p view or are you you in the 3p view" John
Clark wouldn't have any idea how to respond to such a silly question.
Indeed, very silly question. I can't agree more. But that question has
never been asked by me or anyone on this list, except you.
Therefore "what one and only one thing will *you* see after the
duplication?"
The question is more how you evaluate the chance of seeing Moscow
(say). If you say P = 1, then in the iterated case you must predict
MMMMMMM... and the chance of this diminish like 2^n, as almost all
copies confirm.
has no answer because it is not a question at all, it is just
gibberish with a question mark at the end.
If that is gibberish, then you are telling me that you die when you
are duplicated. If you don't die, it is enough to distinguish the 3-1
from the 1p views to get the answer right.
OK, my pause-café is finished, back to work. Nothing new in this post:
you are just doing the 3-1 versus 1 confusion, and even vindicate it
by "the hell with the views", which is the key notion to proceed.
You might try to tell me at once how do you predict the personal
seeing of an eclipse in a universe containing an execution of a
universal dovetailer.
Bruno
John K Clark
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