On 14 Aug 2015, at 07:48, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 at 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> after the door is opened there is no such thing as "the 1-
view".
> I have explained why this is directly refuted by all copies.
So is THE 1-view a view of Moscow or of Washington?
> a natural confusion between 3-1 views and 1-views.
Confusion naturally arises because Bruno Marchal can not
explain what the "3-1 views"
I explained it, so I will look at your critics below.
is supposed to mean without lots of personal pronouns that are all
rendered meaningless in a world with people duplicating machines.
you have failed to show any problem with the name and pronouns. Each
time you equivocate the 1p and the 3p, or the 1-1p and the 3-1p, etc.
> See below for more.
Why? There is little of substance below.
I hope that this is not the critics.
>>> they all feel to be different from the others
>> Yes, and that's exactly why there are 7.1 billion
1ps and not just one.
> Sure, in the 3-1 view. But [...]
To hell with the "but", unless you're a solipsist and believe
there are 7.1 billion zombies on the Earth not people then the are
7.1 billion 1ps on this planet, and there are no buts about it.
Stathis answered this recently, and others did regularly since, and
your critics consists just in avoiding the question by avoiding the
1-3 nuances.
Some scientist believe that we cannot talk on the 1p in science, but
they do an level confusion error. We cannot use 1p in a proof, but we
can use proof about 1p, once we have a good 3p definition of it, which
is given in the UD Argument. With the diary (but of course your
comment was "the hell of the diary ...").
>> Those damn diaries again! The diaries are useless after
the duplication unless the person who wrote them could be
unambiguously identified and you can't do that;
> False. (Easy exercise, done many times).
Somehow I missed that so please do that exercise one more time and
point to THE one and only one person who wrote the diary now that
the duplication has been made. Or if you think pointing is impolite
just tell me if "he" lives in Washington or Moscow.
I have answered that question many times.
In the 3-1 view, you will exist in W and in M.
From the 1-1 view, you will feel to be in one city.
And the question is on the "pure" 1-view, like in "what do you expect
to live as experience".
>> There is no purely logical reason to make coffee or not
to make coffee, but people who enjoy being alive and are good
at hypothesizing what the future will be like are more likely
to pass more of their genes into the next generation than people
who don't enjoy life and aren't good at making plans for the
future. So you prepared that coffee because you have some of those
genes.
> You make my point,
Glad to be of service.
> and explicitly contradict yours.
Where? Show me!
Stathis just did that. You say that yhe subjective first person
experience that we denote by W and M are incompatibe subjective
experience, but you keep talking like if P(W & M) ≠ 0..
> Search on "Searle" in the archive for more.
Why should I search for more idiocy? Searle is a moron and
his Chinese room is imbecilic.
Searles argument is invalid to refute comp. We agree on that.
>> What remains un-predicted?
> The personal experience that the candidate in Helsinki can
expect to live.
If The Helsinki Man's name is Ed and if Ed is logical and if Ed
expects to be duplicated then Ed would expect that there would not
be just one answer to that question there would be two because
that's what happens when people are duplicated.
In the fairy tales. But after a duplication, subjectively, ypu don't
feel the split, cannot even be' sure there has been one, except by
believing the protocol.
1P/3P CONFUSION again and again and again ...
Yes that seems unusual but it's not illogical and it's only
unusual because we haven't seen it yet , and we haven't seen it yet
for technological reasons and not for scientific, logical or
philosophical reasons. A few decades from now this entire debate
will seem as quaint as a butterchurn.
yes, everyone will asks themselves how you were unable to grasp the
FPI, which will be lived by all possible experiencer (or digital
mechanism is false).
> By reasoning, and using comp,
I never use "comp" and never will until I know what it means and I
don't and neither do you.
See the definition in any of my paper, or in the archive. Comp is the
doctrine according to which the brain is turing emulable at some level
so that we can accept an artificial brain, or do teleportation as
described in our thought experiment, etc.
Your unwillingness to accept that definition might say long on your
state of mind. You really looks like someone dreaming to refute an
argument, without any rational argument or reason.
>>> And ask if you will be that M guy or that W guy.
>> You you and you! Even at this late stage Bruno Marchal
just can't stop using that god damn ambiguous personal pronoun!
> Because it was just made clear that the question was asked in
Helsinki, and you have recently, and more than once, accepted that
the pronoun was not ambiguous in Helsinki (i.e. before the
duplication).
Yes, but to confirm or reject the prediction THE one and only
"you" must be found and interviewed AFTER the duplication.
Indeed, but as the guy has been duplicated "THE" (unique) experience
is lived by two individuals, so to get "The" confirmation we must
interview all copies, and all confirms that THE experience describes
only once city. There is nothing weird. Both copies confirms P(W v M)
= 1 and both confirms P(W & M) = 0.
It would be easy to find Bruno Marchal after the duplication and
easy to find Ed, but it would be impossible to find "you" because
people duplicating machines have made that personal pronoun ambiguous.
it is not ambiguous. WE have agreed on all use of pronouns, even on
the 1 3 differences. the mystery is just that you systematically
forget that the question is on the experience that you expect or can
expect to live, not on a 3p description of all experiences that you
can expect to live (which is just the protocol).
And that is exactly why Bruno Marchal loves personal pronouns, only
by liberally using them can Bruno Marchal state a ambiguous theory
of personal identity.
Lies, as more than one gave you a version without pronouns. Including
me. i will no more do that again. Just looks at the posts already sent.
> the ambiguity of pronouns is in your head only, as most of us have
shown to you more than once.
Then prove me wrong by giving The Helsinki Man a name and stop using
those stupid pronouns! But of course Bruno Marchal will never do that.
You are either lying, or suffering of serious memory problems.
> I was in Helsinki, and did not know if I would have become
the W or the M guy,
And even after the duplication "I" still doesn't know if "I" is
the W guy or the M guy because that personal pronoun has become
meaningless by people duplicating machines, and that is why Bruno
Marchal loves them so much, ambiguous words come in very handy in
describing ambiguous ideas.
The 1-I is never meaning less. It is the one who feel the burn if a
flame touch the fingers that he is able to move. The 3-1 is never
ambiguous either. You keep insisting on an "ambiguity" where
computationalism explains that there is no ambiguity at all once we
distinguish the 1-I and the 3-I, either with the diary, or with
Theaetetus.
> given that I become both of them in the 3-1 description of
the protocol.
But unfortunately nobody, including Bruno Marchal, knows what
the 3-1 description is supposed to mean.
I have recalled them just yesterday. What is it that you don't
understand? You don't even quote the explanation.
> Yet, after pushing the button, I get the personal, private,
and non justifiable feeling that I am the one in W,and not the
one, in M
And "I" gets the personal, private, and non justifiable feeling
that "I" am the one in M and not the one in W. Use the man's name
and STOP USING PRONOUNS!!
Show me why I can't use pronoun, WITHOUT ABSTRACTING YOURSELF FROM
PERSONS POV!
> just tell me now if you have grasped the difference between
the 3p and the 3-1p *and* the difference between the 3-1p and the 1p.
John Clark has not grasped the difference and does not believe
that Bruno Marchal has either.
OK, but then tell me what you don't understand. I don't know anybody
having the slightest problem with it for a so long run.
> Nobody knows if it's confirmed or not because nobody knows
what the 3-1 view is.
> I have just explained it in the post of yesterday.
A explanation filled to the brim with personal pronouns and thus
useless. Drop the peepee and the pronouns and give the poor man a
name, how about "Ed", it's no harder to type than "he".
OK. When, after the duplication, Ed is in both W and M, Ed, in both
place, makes a self-localization experiment and both Ed are forced to
realize that, after all, they see only (W xor M). Ed-M and Ed-W
bitterly regret not having have had the foresight on this, and admits,
at last, that P(W & M) was plain false, and P(W xor M) was correct,
given that W and M refers to 1-experience, and not 3p or 3-1p
description of possible experiences.
>>> but is refuted for both the W-guy and the H-guy.
>> The W-guy and the M-guy can't refute anything because the
prediction wasn't made about them,
> The question was about them, as we have agreed that they are
both the H-guy.
A camel is a mammal but a mammal is not a camel, a dog is a mammal
but a dog is not a camel. Both the W man set and the M man set are
larger sets than the H man set, they have all the elements of the H
man set plus more.
> The computationalist indeterminacy does not assume Quantum
Mechanics.
I know.
> It is subject of controverse in QM (cf "God does not play
with dice", or "Does it?").
Quantum indeterminacy was controversial 75 years ago, but
not today.
Consult the literature. Or just look at this list. There is no
unanimity on how to interpret the quantum wave or matrix equation,
still less on what happens when we do a measurement, and where the
probabilities come from. Not all many-worlder use the FPI, contrary to
what we might beleiev when we know computationalism.
> With Everett, the QM indeterminacy is arguably reduced to the
comp indeterminacy,
I don't care, I'm not interested in "comp" anything.
I believe the contrary. if you would be not interested, you would not
try to refute the UD argument. You would just say that you are not
intersted in the consequence of comp (which is just an abrreviation
for the indexical computationalism that I use; that is: "Church's
thesis = "yes doctor"). See sane04 and this list for more.
>> and of the Godel/Turing type discovered 90 years ago.
> The FPI has just nothing to do with the definition of that
type of indeterminacies.
I know, FPI is silly but Godel/Turing indeterminacy is not.
I see you don't quote my attempt to make you realize we can avoid the
thought experiements, and the 1p/3p nuance made with the diary, by
using Smullyan's B (= Gödel beweisbar) and Smullyan's C (where he use
implicitly the Theaetetus' idea).
I guess your reading of Forever Undecided was superficial, as you can
use that work to get the hypostases. In the original dissertation, the
UD paradox is used only to motivate for the []p & p, or []p & Dt, or
[]p & <>t & p nuances (I was told in advance that he members of the
jury would not read the thought experiments, ever and thus I presented
them as paradoxes to feed the thought, and to motivate precise
definition. Obviously, for the layman, the thought experience are FAR
more easy than understanding that beweisbar obeys G and G*, and lead
to the different logic for each pov.
You fight only imaginary confusion that you introduce by failing to
take the 1-3 difference into account, and this repetitively since
sometimes. Do it with the diary, and if you don't like that, do it
with modal logic, which means in arithmetic, given that the main modal
operator used is defined in arithmetic.
Keep in mind that my thesis is a thesis on Gödel, Löb and Solovay
theorem, and their impact on physics, notably.
It is controversial, because some scientists believe that terms like
"mind", consciousness" and even "quantum" are crackpot, but that is
just because they are, sometimes consciously, defenders of the
Aristotelian naturalist dogma. You are not, I think. So your
irrational deny looks just gratuitous, if not insane.
Ask me anything if you have still a difficulty with the 1-1 versus 3-1
difference. I can give simple example (again). The problem is that
now, it seems you get it, but just avoid using it after the
duplication. So your position is more and more like a simple deny of a
very simple facts that only you, and perhaps Peck, seems to miss.
Bruno
John K Clark
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