On 31 Aug 2015, at 01:54, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 30 Aug 2015, at 03:08, Russell Standish wrote:
Well as people probably know, I don't believe C. elegans can be
conscious in any sense of the word. Hell - I have strong doubts about
ants, and they're massively more complex creatures.
I think personally that C. Elegans, and Planaria (!), even amoeba,
are conscious, although very plausibly not self-conscious.
I tend to think since 2008 that even RA is already conscious, even
maximally so, and that PA is already as much self-conscious than a
human (when in some dissociative state).
What realization did you have in 2008 that changed your mind?
The salvia experience. It corroborates the idea that the brain filter
consciousness. By disabling or dissociating some neuronal pathway, you
can get quite amnesic (not even remembering what a person is, nor what
is time, space, ...), knowing basically nothing, and yet feeling much
more conscious than in the "mundane state" + a felling that this is
your normal basic state.
Of course I am biased on this, but some salvia experience are like
remembering that we are indeed immaterial creature living in an
immaterial reality (arithmetic?), and that our consciousness is
processed mainly there. The brain is used only to make that
consciousness able to manifest itself relatively to deep (in Bennett
sense) first person plural sharable computations/experiences. It is an
interface, and a local self-accelerator.
With salvia, Chardin statement is quite senseful: "we ar not hulan
having divine experiences from time to time, but divine beings having
human experiences from time to time".
But the "consciousness filter" theory of brain leads also to some
difficulties. I can come back on them someday.
Bruno
But I don't know if PA is more or less conscious than RA. That
depends of the role of the higher part of the brain consists in
filtering consciousness or enacting it.
But it probably won't be long before we simulate a mouse brain in toto
- about 2 decades is my guess, maybe even less given enough dollars -
then we're definitely in grey philosophical territory :).
I am slightly less optimistic than you. It will take one of two
decades before we simulate the hippocampus of a rat, but probably
more time will be needed for the rest of their brain.
Perhaps 2 decades from simulating a rat brain on a PC, but super
computers are generally up to a million times more powerful than a
single CPU, which means they are roughly 2 decades ahead in
computing power (assuming annual doubling in computational capacity).
OK. Maybe.
And the result can be a conscious creature, with a quite different
consciousness that a rat, as I find plausible that pain are related
to the glial cells and their metabolism, which are not taken into
account by the current "copies".
Interesting. Why do you think glial cell metabolism plays a roll in
pain sensation?
I was thinking about the discovery that glial cells play a role in the
nociceptive pathway.
See this for example: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20581331
You can google on "glial cells chronic pain" to find many papers on
this. We know that glial cells communicate with each others, although
not with axons but with wave of chemical influences, and we know also
that glial cells communicate with neurons, (and with the immune system).
I would not say "yes" to a doctor who does not take into account the
glial cells, unless there is no choice. I can imagine staying
conscious, but having different qualia. I can imagine supporting this
for some weeks, but that it would be an heavy handicap for a longer
survival.
Bruno
Jason
One intersting test I'd like to see is applying Tononi's integrated
information measure to these simple creatures to see if they're
producing any integrated information. I suspect Integrated Information
is a necessary requirement for conscious, but not so sure about
sufficiency.
It is offred freely with the notion of self-reference, I would say.
The eight hypostases/persons-pov constitute each a different mode of
the self-integration. If Kauffman's idea that the DNA results from
something akin to Kleene's diagonalization (which I think too) the
amoeba and most protozoans are already quite self-integrated being.
Then elementary invertebrates might loose that integration (like
perhaps hydra), but quickly get it back, like with planaria.
I guess that you remember that I am not yet convinced by your
argument that ants are not conscious, as it relies on anthropic use
of the Absolute Self-Sampling Assumption (ASSA) which I prefer to
avoid because the domain of its statistic is not clear to me. (I am
not impressed by the doomsday argument for the same reason).
Bruno
Cheers
On Sat, Aug 29, 2015 at 09:00:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Aug 2015, at 00:43, Jason Resch wrote:
I think so. It is at least as conscious as C. Elegans.
Assuming that the worm comp substitution level of neuronal
connection is the correct choice.
Low level animals behavior might rely heavily on smell and other
chemical interaction, and I am not sure what the sensor represents
in the robots represent, as C. Elegans is blind (I think).
Hard to really conclude it is thinking from the video, and
theoretically, we can't never be sure. It might be a philosophical
worm zombie!
Bruno
Jason
On Fri, Aug 28, 2015 at 6:21 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 8/28/2015 3:00 PM, Jason wrote:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2_i1NKPzbjM
So what do you think? Is it conscious?
Bremt
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