On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 30 Aug 2015, at 03:08, Russell Standish wrote: > > Well as people probably know, I don't believe C. elegans can be >> conscious in any sense of the word. Hell - I have strong doubts about >> ants, and they're massively more complex creatures. >> > > I think personally that C. Elegans, and Planaria (!), even amoeba, are > conscious, although very plausibly not self-conscious. > > I tend to think since 2008 that even RA is already conscious, even > maximally so, and that PA is already as much self-conscious than a human > (when in some dissociative state). > What realization did you have in 2008 that changed your mind? > > But I don't know if PA is more or less conscious than RA. That depends of > the role of the higher part of the brain consists in filtering > consciousness or enacting it. > > >> But it probably won't be long before we simulate a mouse brain in toto >> - about 2 decades is my guess, maybe even less given enough dollars - >> then we're definitely in grey philosophical territory :). >> > > I am slightly less optimistic than you. It will take one of two decades > before we simulate the hippocampus of a rat, but probably more time will be > needed for the rest of their brain. Perhaps 2 decades from simulating a rat brain on a PC, but super computers are generally up to a million times more powerful than a single CPU, which means they are roughly 2 decades ahead in computing power (assuming annual doubling in computational capacity). > And the result can be a conscious creature, with a quite different > consciousness that a rat, as I find plausible that pain are related to the > glial cells and their metabolism, which are not taken into account by the > current "copies". Interesting. Why do you think glial cell metabolism plays a roll in pain sensation? Jason > > > >> One intersting test I'd like to see is applying Tononi's integrated >> information measure to these simple creatures to see if they're >> producing any integrated information. I suspect Integrated Information >> is a necessary requirement for conscious, but not so sure about >> sufficiency. >> > > It is offred freely with the notion of self-reference, I would say. The > eight hypostases/persons-pov constitute each a different mode of the > self-integration. If Kauffman's idea that the DNA results from something > akin to Kleene's diagonalization (which I think too) the amoeba and most > protozoans are already quite self-integrated being. Then elementary > invertebrates might loose that integration (like perhaps hydra), but > quickly get it back, like with planaria. > > I guess that you remember that I am not yet convinced by your argument > that ants are not conscious, as it relies on anthropic use of the Absolute > Self-Sampling Assumption (ASSA) which I prefer to avoid because the domain > of its statistic is not clear to me. (I am not impressed by the doomsday > argument for the same reason). > > Bruno > > > > > >> Cheers >> >> On Sat, Aug 29, 2015 at 09:00:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >>> On 29 Aug 2015, at 00:43, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> I think so. It is at least as conscious as C. Elegans. >>>> >>> >>> >>> Assuming that the worm comp substitution level of neuronal >>> connection is the correct choice. >>> >>> Low level animals behavior might rely heavily on smell and other >>> chemical interaction, and I am not sure what the sensor represents >>> in the robots represent, as C. Elegans is blind (I think). >>> >>> Hard to really conclude it is thinking from the video, and >>> theoretically, we can't never be sure. It might be a philosophical >>> worm zombie! >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Jason >>>> >>>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2015 at 6:21 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> On 8/28/2015 3:00 PM, Jason wrote: >>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2_i1NKPzbjM >>>> >>>> So what do you think? Is it conscious? >>>> >>>> Bremt >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> -- >> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >> Principal, High Performance Coders >> Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] >> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
