On 9/7/2015 10:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 8 September 2015 at 09:19, Brent Meeker <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



    On 9/7/2015 3:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


    On Tuesday, September 8, 2015, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
    <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



        On 9/6/2015 10:49 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


        On Monday, September 7, 2015, Brent Meeker
        <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



            On 9/6/2015 7:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


            On Sun, Sep 6, 2015 at 8:23 PM, Brent Meeker
            <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

                $2, because you can just say "Monday" each time
                you're asked.  It has nothing to do with
                probabilities.  It's a good analogue of the MWI
                problem; when everything is deterministic and
                everything happens there's no objective measure.


            There are many "interpretations" of prboability:
            https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_interpretations

            I think the thought experiment I describe is an example
            of probability under the "frequentist" definition.

            No, there's no randomness in it.  There's no
            distribution to approximate in repeated trials.


        It's the same kind of randomness that emerges from
        multiverse theories.

        Right, a kind which doesn't (in most models) have a
        probability interpretation because there's no clear measure.

        You presumably estimate probabilities in everyday life, and
        generally it serves you well.

        Sure,  I make subjective estimates by hypothesizing some
        ensemble of possibilities with a measure on it - but I don't
        infer from this that all those hypotheticals really happen or
        that the probability I come up with is an objective fact
        about the world.


    But can you infer something about the nature of the world from
    the fact that probabilities seem to be useful?

    Sure, I infer that my hypothetical measure, or the model I used to
    to generate it, may have to some grain of truth, some generality
    beyond the special case.


Would you also say that given a probability cannot be assigned to a coin toss if the world splits and both heads and tails occur in parallel worlds, and given that probabilities are actually useful with coin tosses, this is evidence that we don't live in a world where all coin toss outcomes are realised?

Is our failure to experience the parallel worlds evidence they don't exist? No. So it's not evidence either way.

Brent

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