2015-09-08 18:17 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <[email protected]>: > > > On 9/7/2015 10:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 8 September 2015 at 09:19, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 9/7/2015 3:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, September 8, 2015, Brent Meeker < <[email protected]> >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 9/6/2015 10:49 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, September 7, 2015, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 9/6/2015 7:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, Sep 6, 2015 at 8:23 PM, Brent Meeker < <[email protected]> >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> $2, because you can just say "Monday" each time you're asked. It has >>>>> nothing to do with probabilities. It's a good analogue of the MWI >>>>> problem; >>>>> when everything is deterministic and everything happens there's no >>>>> objective measure. >>>>> >>>> >>>> There are many "interpretations" of prboability: >>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_interpretations> >>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_interpretations >>>> >>>> I think the thought experiment I describe is an example of probability >>>> under the "frequentist" definition. >>>> >>>> >>>> No, there's no randomness in it. There's no distribution to >>>> approximate in repeated trials. >>>> >>> >>> It's the same kind of randomness that emerges from multiverse theories. >>> >>> >>> Right, a kind which doesn't (in most models) have a probability >>> interpretation because there's no clear measure. >>> >>> You presumably estimate probabilities in everyday life, and generally >>> it serves you well. >>> >>> >>> Sure, I make subjective estimates by hypothesizing some ensemble of >>> possibilities with a measure on it - but I don't infer from this that all >>> those hypotheticals really happen or that the probability I come up with is >>> an objective fact about the world. >>> >> >> But can you infer something about the nature of the world from the fact >> that probabilities seem to be useful? >> >> >> Sure, I infer that my hypothetical measure, or the model I used to to >> generate it, may have to some grain of truth, some generality beyond the >> special case. >> > > Would you also say that given a probability cannot be assigned to a coin > toss if the world splits and both heads and tails occur in parallel worlds, > and given that probabilities are actually useful with coin tosses, this is > evidence that we don't live in a world where all coin toss outcomes are > realised? > > > Is our failure to experience the parallel worlds evidence they don't > exist? No. So it's not evidence either way. >
So why insisting you cannot assign probabilities in one case ? if the fact of doing it or not is not evidence for or against... either it works, and it's useful. > > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
