On Wed, Sep 9, 2015 at 12:40 AM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 9/8/2015 8:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 at 9:44 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On 9/09/2015 12:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellett < <[email protected]> >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 9/09/2015 9:30 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> On 9 September 2015 at 09:23, Bruce Kellett < >>> <[email protected]>[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 9/09/2015 8:56 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> On 8 September 2015 at 22:11, Bruce Kellett < >>>> <[email protected]>[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellett < >>>>> <[email protected]>[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 8/09/2015 8:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 8 September 2015 at 17:39, Bruce Kellett < >>>>>> <[email protected]>[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 8/09/2015 4:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I will ask you the same question as I did Brent: do you conclude >>>>>>> from the fact that when you toss a coin it comes up either as head or >>>>>>> tails >>>>>>> that the world does not split into two parallel versions of you, one of >>>>>>> which sees heads and the other tails? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I would conclude that a coin toss does not provide any evidence for >>>>>>> multiple worlds or a split. The only evidence we have from this data is >>>>>>> that the outcome of the toss is uncertain. There is no evidence there >>>>>>> for >>>>>>> any split of anything. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It is not evidence FOR a split but is it evidence AGAINST a split? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It is evidence that the assumption of a split is not necessary in >>>>>> order to understand everyday happenings. So, by the application of >>>>>> Occam's >>>>>> Razor, no split happens. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So you agree that we would still observe the probabilities we do if we >>>>> lived in a deterministic world in whaich all possibilities are realised? >>>>> >>>>> No, because not all possibilities happen in this world. If all >>>>> possibilities were realized in this world, then there would be no >>>>> uncertainty, no probabilities. Possibility and actuality would be the same >>>>> thing. All the horses would win the Melbourne cup; and we don't live in >>>>> such a world. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Obviously, not all possibilities happen in this world, but they might >>>> happen in parallel worlds that don't interact with each other. The argument >>>> is that probabilities emerge from this, since you don't know which world >>>> you will find yourself in. You bet on the favourite in the race because you >>>> think you are more likely to end up in a world in which the favourite wins. >>>> >>>> In other words, probabilities can make perfect sense in a single >>>> deterministic world. This was understood a long time ago with the >>>> development of statistical mechanics. The idea that "all possibilities >>>> happen in parallel worlds" does not actually make a lot of sense. There is >>>> no current physical theory that implies this (without the addition of a lot >>>> of unevidenced assumptions). So probabilities do not emerge from this, they >>>> come from quite simple assumptions of randomness and ignorance. >>>> >>>> Probability in the MWI of quantum mechanics is problematic. Regardless >>>> of claims to be able to derive the Born Rule in Everettian models, all >>>> attempts fail because they are circular -- they need the Born rule in order >>>> to have non-interacting worlds, so you cannot then use these independent >>>> worlds to derive the Born rule. Gleason's theorem is no help -- it suffers >>>> from all the same problems as the Deutsch-Wallace approach. >>>> >>> >>> You don't seem to be disputing that we would still experience a >>> probabilistic world even if all possibilities were actually realised, even >>> though you do dispute that we in fact live in such a world. >>> >>> I'm not sure if you are disputing that, to give a simple model case, if >>> a coin was tossed and the world split in two, with one version of you >>> seeing heads and the other tails, the probability of each outcome is 1/2. >>> >>> Whether or not all possibilities are realized, they are not in evidence, >>> so their relevance to the question of probabilities is questionable. >>> >>> Your simple model case of a coin toss causing a world split is just a >>> made-up example to give the result you want, so again its relevance is >>> dubious. There is no sensible physical theory in which the world splits on >>> classical coin tosses. >>> >> >> If you can't imagine a world split, consider a virtual reality in which >> the program forks every time a coin is tossed, one fork seeing heads and >> the other tails. You are an observer in this world and you have this >> information, so you know for certain that "all possibilities are realised" >> when the coin is tossed. What would you say about your expectation of >> seeing heads? >> >> I presume you mean that the world is duplicated on each toss, with one >> branch showing each outcome. We are back to the dreaded "person >> duplication" problem. My opinion on this is that on such a duplication, two >> new persons are created, so the probability that the original person will >> see either heads or tails is precisely zero, because that person no longer >> exists after the duplication. >> > > So if some aliens create a copy of you in Andromeda, then you cease to > exist as a person? > > Note: according to current comological models, space is infinite and > uniform, which means infinite copies of you exist (though very far away). > > > Not if spacetime is a continuum - and there's evidence that it is. > How does space being a continuum square with the Holographic Principal, or the Bekenstein Bound, which seem to indicate there is a finite amount of information present within any finite volume of space? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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