On 9 September 2015 at 16:46, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 9/09/2015 2:33 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 9 September 2015 at 14:28, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On 9/09/2015 2:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 9 September 2015 at 13:40, Bruce Kellett < <[email protected]> >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 9/09/2015 1:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> On 9 September 2015 at 12:44, Bruce Kellett < >>> <[email protected]>[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 9/09/2015 12:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellett < >>>> <[email protected]>[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Whether or not all possibilities are realized, they are not in >>>>> evidence, so their relevance to the question of probabilities is >>>>> questionable. >>>>> >>>>> Your simple model case of a coin toss causing a world split is just a >>>>> made-up example to give the result you want, so again its relevance is >>>>> dubious. There is no sensible physical theory in which the world splits on >>>>> classical coin tosses. >>>>> >>>> >>>> If you can't imagine a world split, consider a virtual reality in which >>>> the program forks every time a coin is tossed, one fork seeing heads and >>>> the other tails. You are an observer in this world and you have this >>>> information, so you know for certain that "all possibilities are realised" >>>> when the coin is tossed. What would you say about your expectation of >>>> seeing heads? >>>> >>>> I presume you mean that the world is duplicated on each toss, with one >>>> branch showing each outcome. We are back to the dreaded "person >>>> duplication" problem. My opinion on this is that on such a duplication, two >>>> new persons are created, so the probability that the original person will >>>> see either heads or tails is precisely zero, because that person no longer >>>> exists after the duplication. >>>> >>> >>> After the coin has been tossed a few times, you (or one of the entities >>> identifying as you) will say that, despite the opinion he expressed on 9th >>> September on the Everything List, it does seem that he has survived the >>> duplication and that heads comes up about half the time. >>> >>> It is a question whether it is just the person who is duplicated, or >>> whether it is the whole world split into two non-communicating replicates. >>> In the former case, two new persons are created and they will experience >>> normal probabilistic outcomes of coin tosses. The second case (duplicate, >>> non-interacting worlds), is indistinguishable from a simple series of coin >>> tosses in this one world -- duplication has added nothing. >>> >> >> What if you are locked in a prison cell isolated from the world, and the >> prison cell is duplicated without your knowledge? What if in a year you are >> released and meet your duplicate? What if you are never released but are >> informed of the duplication? >> >> You can make any number of artificial scenarios that appear to imply >> almost anything you want. Whereas, actually, they imply nothing at all, >> because such artificial scenarios have nothing to do with the real world. >> >> If under these duplication scenarios you are fooled into thinking that >> you have not been duplicated, then you might think that you have continued >> as the same unique person. You would, however, be mistaken in that belief. >> Nothing unusual here -- most people have mistaken beliefs about any number >> of things. >> > > You could also claim that you are fooled into thinking that you have > continued as the same unique person in everyday life, since the matter > constituting your body has changed. It's arbitrary to say that in the > everyday life scenario you have survived while in other duplication > scenarios you only have the delusional belief that you have survived. > > Not at all. In everyday life there is a continuity of body as well as of > thought and memory. Plus the all important fact that the continuer is > unique. Immediately you introduce a non-uniqueness into the continuer(s), > you destroy the conditions for continued personal identity. > The other way to look at it is that there is no continuity of body, thought and memory in everyday life because you are continually dying and being replaced with a copy who believes he is you. It is no less legitimate than saying the copy isn't you. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
