On 9/9/2015 12:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 9 September 2015 at 17:06, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 9/09/2015 4:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 9 September 2015 at 16:46, Bruce Kellett
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Not at all. In everyday life there is a continuity of body as
well as of thought and memory. Plus the all important fact
that the continuer is unique. Immediately you introduce a
non-uniqueness into the continuer(s), you destroy the
conditions for continued personal identity.
The other way to look at it is that there is no continuity of
body, thought and memory in everyday life because you are
continually dying and being replaced with a copy who believes he
is you. It is no less legitimate than saying the copy isn't you.
That is an absurd proposition. Your complete body is not replaced
from moment to moment: you lose some cells, and they are replaced
in an orderly manner and you do not die in this process. There is
clear bodily continuity.
On what basis have you decided that you have survived, even though all
the matter in your body may have been replaced? Probably because
people claim to be the same person that they were previously and there
is no-one to dispute it. The same would happen with destructive
duplication, despite discontinuity, and also with duplication where
the duplicates could never meet. But not having a fight with your
duplicate over your possessions would seem better suited to a legal
rather than a philosophical definition of personal identity.
The law needs rationales too and while philosophers can obfuscate
endlessly judges have to make decisions. So I'm inclined to take the
legal decisions more seriously than the philosophical ones. And this
points to the fact that no decision about personal continuity needs to
be made; a judge could simply designate you and your copy as Stathis-a
and Stathis-1 and divide property equally. You wife and children could
decide how they wanted to regard you. That's an example of why I think
an "engineering" approach will eventually dissolve the "hard problem".
Brent
That aside, however, the essential difference with the copying
scenarios is that the uniqueness of the continuer is generally
lost. Uniqueness is essential for any sensible understanding of
personal identity.
I would still insist I was me if I were duplicated, and I'm sure you
would too.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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