On 11 Sep 2015, at 04:08, Jason Resch wrote:
I interpreted the higher beings in the sense of "multiple
realizability", as Turing wrote in his 1950 paper,
"The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine was to be entirely
mechanical will help us to rid ourselves of a superstition.
Importance is often attached to the fact that modern digital
computers are electrical, and that the nervous system also is
electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not electrical, and since
all digital computers are in a sense equivalent, we see that this
use of electricity cannot be of theoretical importance. Of course
electricity usually comes in where fast signalling is concerned, so
that it is not surprising that we find it in both these connections.
In the nervous system chemical phenomena are at least as important
as electrical. In certain computers the storage system is mainly
acoustic. The feature of using electricity is thus seen to be only a
very superficial similarity. If we wish to find such similarities we
should took rather for mathematical analogies of function."
I am not sure at all of your interpretation Jason. Logicians like
Gödel and Turing would not use "higher" in such a sense. And I am not
sure Gödel talked about the 1950 paper, as Gödel was a tiny bit anti-
mechanist, I do think that by "higher" he meant "divine", in the
theological realm, or belonging to a large, perhaps very large,
cardinal.
Note that the multiple realisability entails directly that not only
electricity is superficial, but given that the computation can be
realized in and by any Turing universal system, the physicalness is
itself superficial. A tiny part of elementary arithmetic is Turing
universal.
So aliens or beings on other worlds, or in other universes, need not
be made of the same particles, or same elements/chemicals as we, if
it is the functions/patterns/mathematical relations that determine
consciousness.
Interesting but I am not sure if that was what Gödel thought about.
(But I confess I have not yet read the entire work of Gödel, I still
miss probably some of the unpublished writings)
Bruno
I read the formal rights in the same way you did, that ethics/
politics is an objective, rather than subjective science.
Jason
On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz <[email protected]> wrote:
OK, I think it's 100%. I'm just not sure what it means that the
higher beings are connected by analogy not composition, and "formal
rights comprise a real science" (unless he means there is something
objectively knowable about ethics). That said, the higher beings
thing sounds like something I *would* agree with, if I understood
it... ;)
On Friday, September 11, 2015 at 11:16:09 AM UTC+10, Jason wrote:
Which of the 14 points did you not agree with?
As for his ontological proof, I think that was more something he did
for fun, to see if he could impart some rigor to Anselm's argument.
Jason
On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 5:13 PM, Pierz <[email protected]> wrote:
It's amazing to me that a man of Gödel's brilliance could take the
drivel of the ontological argument seriously. Did I miss something
about that specious piece of sophistry? Other than that I'm in 87.5%
agreement with him...
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