On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 9:18 PM, Pierz <[email protected]> wrote:

> Ah nice - your interpretation makes perfect sense. And in that case, I
> guess it is 100%. How "complete" is your agreement with Gödel?
>
>
1. ~100%
2. ~100%
3. Unsure. I don't know that all problems have solutions.
4. ~100%
5. ~98%
6. 100%
7. Not sure what he means by thoroughly intelligible.
8. 85% (many directions at least).
9. 95%
10. 90% In philosophy of mind, I believe materialism is false in so far as
any particular matter being important.
11. ~99% if he is describing multiple realizability
12. ~100%
13. Unsure. I believe this subject can be studied scientifically, but do
answers to all ethical questions converge, or diverge?
14. Whether most human religions are a net negative or net positive, I
can't say. Certainly there have been many good and many bad things emerging
from human religions. I agree that religion in itself is not inherently a
bad thing.

Jason

On Friday, September 11, 2015 at 12:08:37 PM UTC+10, Jason wrote:
>>
>> I interpreted the higher beings in the sense of "multiple realizability",
>> as Turing wrote in his 1950 paper,
>>
>> "The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine was to be entirely mechanical
>> will help us to rid ourselves of a superstition. Importance is often
>> attached to the fact that modern digital computers are electrical, and that
>> the nervous system also is electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not
>> electrical, and since all digital computers are in a sense equivalent, we
>> see that this use of electricity cannot be of theoretical importance. Of
>> course electricity usually comes in where fast signalling is concerned, so
>> that it is not surprising that we find it in both these connections. In the
>> nervous system chemical phenomena are at least as important as electrical.
>> In certain computers the storage system is mainly acoustic. The feature of
>> using electricity is thus seen to be only a very superficial similarity. If
>> we wish to find such similarities we should took rather for mathematical
>> analogies of function."
>>
>>
>> So aliens or beings on other worlds, or in other universes, need not be
>> made of the same particles, or same elements/chemicals as we, if it is the
>> functions/patterns/mathematical relations that determine consciousness.
>>
>> I read the formal rights in the same way you did, that ethics/politics is
>> an objective, rather than subjective science.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>> OK, I think it's 100%. I'm just not sure what it means that the higher
>>> beings are connected by analogy not composition, and "formal rights
>>> comprise a real science" (unless he means there is something objectively
>>> knowable about ethics). That said, the higher beings thing sounds like
>>> something I *would* agree with, if I understood it... ;)
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 11, 2015 at 11:16:09 AM UTC+10, Jason wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Which of the 14 points did you not agree with?
>>>>
>>>> As for his ontological proof, I think that was more something he did
>>>> for fun, to see if he could impart some rigor to Anselm's argument.
>>>>
>>>> Jason
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 5:13 PM, Pierz <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> It's amazing to me that a man of Gödel's brilliance could take the
>>>>> drivel of the ontological argument seriously. Did I miss something about
>>>>> that specious piece of sophistry? Other than that I'm in 87.5% agreement
>>>>> with him...
>>>>>
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