> On 2 Oct 2015, at 12:39 AM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 2/10/2015 5:01 pm, Jason Resch wrote: >> On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 11:45 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >> wrote: >>>> On 2/10/2015 2:22 pm, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>> On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 2:28 AM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> I understand what you mean by "psychological continuity". I simply >>>>> maintain that such a concept makes no sense between conscious beings >>>>> outside each others light cones. >>>> >>>> 1. Do you think you could in theory be taken apart atom by atom, and put >>>> back together to "survive" this ordeal? >>>> 2. Do you think it is important that all atoms be put back into their >>>> exact places, or could two hydrogen atoms, from different parts of your >>>> body and brain be swapped without making a difference? >>>> 3. Do you think you could be reconstituted after being taken apart atom by >>>> atom, using mostly new atoms? >>>> 4. Do you think you could be reconstituted after being taken apart atom by >>>> atom, using an entirely new set of atoms? >>>> 5. Do you think the distance between your deconstruction and >>>> reconstruction is of any relevance to whether or not you survive? >>>> 6. Do you think time between your deconstruction and reconstruction is of >>>> any relevance to whether or not you survive? >>>> 7. Do you think there is some non physical element of you, beyond your >>>> organization of atoms, which must travel to (and be limited by the speed >>>> of light) the location of your reconstruction in order for you to survive >>>> the reconstruction? >>>> >>>> If you answer yes to questions 1-4, and no to questions 5-7, then bringing >>>> up light cones is irrelevent. The existence of identical instances of you >>>> 10^10^28 meters away enable the survival of your consciousness. >>> "Your" consciousness? Your series of questions above all involve a physical >>> transfer of information, in which case light cones are relevant, because >>> there can be no physical transfer of information from you now to a point >>> outside your future light cone. If there is a purported copy of you outside >>> your past and future light cones, then there is no way that it can be >>> verified that it is actually a copy. So the question is purely >>> hypothetical, without operational content. >> >> >> A transfer of information is not required for atoms to be arranged in >> identical form as you. E.g. there might be some machine that instantiates >> all permutations of matter. This machine could recreate you >> without having received any information from where you last existed. The >> question is, what is different about a copy of you created by this machine >> vs. one in which the machine was told which permutation to start with? >> >> Could you provide your answers to questions 1 - 7? > No need because those questions all involve the physical transfer of > information, which is not relevant to purported chance "copies" outside the > light cone. A chance copy anywhere has nothing to do with me since, to be > "me", it would have to be an accurate copy of all my environment -- probably > including all the observable universe. "I" am not just my brain -- I am a > brain-in-a-body-in-a world-in-a-universe. All components are necessary for > personal identity.
When did you come up with the idea that an adequate copy of you must include a copy of the entire observable universe? Suppose you're told that according whatever criteria you have defined you were *inadequately* copied last night in your sleep. You believe you're Bruce Kellett, have his memories, look like him, and everyone who knew Bruce agrees that he seems to be the same guy. However, the atoms just weren't put in place using the right procedure, whatever that might be. What difference does the knowledge of this deficit make to you? What difference does it make to anyone else? >>> If you answered yes to question 7, in what sense is the reconstituted, >>> atom-for-atom identical version of you not alive, or not you, whereas one >>> created by beaming a signal to guide the arrangement of the atoms in a >>> certain way from the location of your destruction, is you or does result in >>> you? >>> >>> >>>> If there can be no physical interaction, then there is no continuity, >>>> psychological or otherwise. >>> >>> In the computationalist doctrine, you are your patterns and information. If >>> those patterns and information continue and survive elsewhere, you survive. >>> The history of how the atoms got to be in the pattern of information they >>> are now in is of no relevance to how the atoms behave and interact. >> >> So much the worse for the computationalist doctrine! It becomes a matter of >> unverifiable faith, so of no relevance to any serious scientist. >> >> Could you level that same attack against any theory of consciousness? > > No. The standard theory of consciousness supervening on the physical matter > of the brain is the subject of extended serious scientific investigation. In > that investigation, the way in which the matter came to be arranged the way > it is is of fundamental importance. Particularly through evolutionary theory. > >> >>> What is even worse, if "The history of how the atoms got to be in the >>> pattern of information they are now in is of no relevance to how the atoms >>> behave and interact", then you have abandoned any possibility of connecting >>> your theory with the physics of the observed universe. >> >> Atoms are, as far as anyone can tell, memoryless. Any non-magical theory of >> mind will assert that atoms placed in an identical arrangement will behave >> identically, and so an exact duplicate will behave exactly the same whether >> it is created by a teleporter, by chance, or by iteration. Do you not agree >> with this? > > I don't agree that a chance arrangement of matter that reproduces my brain is > of any relevance to my continued consciousness. particularly if that body of > matter is outside my light cone. > >> I don't understand your second comment, about abandoning any possibility of >> connecting computationalism to physics. Could you explain? > According to computationalism, physics is found in the measure over > computations that pass through the conscious state. If the way in which > matter comes to be represented in that conscious state is irrelevant to > computationalism, then computationalism abandons any claim to have relevance > to physics. > > Bruce > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
