On 08 Oct 2015, at 00:22, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/7/2015 3:15 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2015, at 23:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/7/2015 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-07 20:46 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <[email protected]>:
On 10/7/2015 4:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But here Clark contradicts all the textbook on the subject. In
fact all what John Clarks says here is that you cannot get a
physical object from an arithmetical computations, which is
trivial, but does not prove the existence of the physical object,
as physical is a relative relational notion in arithmetic.
Those type of argument are only the usual knocking on the table.
Which is very good evidence for the existence of a physical object.
But it is no evidence at all about the ontological status of such
object
It's ontological state is "exists". Bruno wrote above, "...does
not prove the existence of the physical object, as physical is a
relative relational notion in arithmetic." My point is that you
don't have prove the existence of physical objects from Peano's
axioms - there's much stronger evidence readily available.
No, that is evidence for stable information pattern. It is at best
evidence for a sharable dream. And we want explain that stability
without invoking a mysterious ontologically prior matter.
But it's not mysterious, it's a simple inference from everybody
being able to knock on the same table.
Again, that is evidence for a 3p-sharable, or 1p-plural sharable
reality. not for the presence of primary matter or physicalism.
It's much less mysterious than infinite calculations by an abstract
process that calculates infinitely many things.
You need only to understand/accept 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., addition and
multiplication, and Church-Turing thesis or definition.
We want extract its appearance by the computations which solves the
measure problem. Step 8 does not give much choice. using
ostentation works in physics, not in metaphysics, except to test
the physical part of some metaphysics in which physics is
explained. With comp, I don't see any other way to explain a
relation between what we are conscious of and consciousness.
They're both made of matter and its relations.
But how could that matter introduces a first person difference for
equivalent computations? If there is a difference, it means the level
of substitution was wrong, or that there is no such level and
computationalism is false.
The situation can be compared with Bohmian QM. Why introduce special
particles with definite localization when from the person points of
view will not make any difference?
Why introduce metaphysical stuff that we cannot comprehend to only
avoid looking at a testable theory?
If empirical physics is violated by S4Grz1, X1* and Z1*, then we
*would* have some evidences that something like primitive matter might
exist or that we belong to a "perverse simulation à-la Boström".
Primitive or primary aristotelian matter is like ether in special
relativity, it introduces difficulties, and has no other rôle than
ideology, it seems to me.
Bruno
Brent
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