On 10/7/2015 5:14 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 4:08 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



    On 10/7/2015 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


    2015-10-07 20:46 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <[email protected]
    <mailto:[email protected]>>:



        On 10/7/2015 4:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

            But here Clark contradicts all the textbook on the
            subject. In fact all what John Clarks says here is that
            you cannot get a physical object from an arithmetical
            computations, which is trivial, but does not prove the
            existence of the physical object, as physical is a
            relative relational notion in arithmetic.
            Those type of argument are only the usual knocking on the
            table.


        Which is very good evidence for the existence of a physical
        object.


    But it is no evidence at all about the ontological status of such
    object

    It's ontological state is "exists".  Bruno wrote above, "...does
    not prove the existence of the physical object, as physical is a
    relative relational notion in arithmetic."  My point is that you
    don't have prove the existence of physical objects from Peano's
    axioms - there's much stronger evidence readily available.


If by stronger evidence you mean your own personal experience, this does not count as proof of the existence of the physical object. All your experience can be used to prove the existence of is that thought.

Proof is for mathematicians and it's only relative to axioms. Evidence is from perception and if you don't accept it as evidence you'll have a hard time getting through the morning.

Brent

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