On 10/7/2015 3:15 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2015, at 23:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/7/2015 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-10-07 20:46 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>:
On 10/7/2015 4:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But here Clark contradicts all the textbook on the subject.
In fact all what John Clarks says here is that you cannot
get a physical object from an arithmetical computations,
which is trivial, but does not prove the existence of the
physical object, as physical is a relative relational notion
in arithmetic.
Those type of argument are only the usual knocking on the table.
Which is very good evidence for the existence of a physical object.
But it is no evidence at all about the ontological status of such object
It's ontological state is "exists". Bruno wrote above, "...does not
prove the existence of the physical object, as physical is a relative
relational notion in arithmetic." My point is that you don't have
prove the existence of physical objects from Peano's axioms - there's
much stronger evidence readily available.
No, that is evidence for stable information pattern. It is at best
evidence for a sharable dream. And we want explain that stability
without invoking a mysterious ontologically prior matter.
But it's not mysterious, it's a simple inference from everybody being
able to knock on the same table. It's much less mysterious than
infinite calculations by an abstract process that calculates infinitely
many things.
We want extract its appearance by the computations which solves the
measure problem. Step 8 does not give much choice. using ostentation
works in physics, not in metaphysics, except to test the physical part
of some metaphysics in which physics is explained. With comp, I don't
see any other way to explain a relation between what we are conscious
of and consciousness.
They're both made of matter and its relations.
Brent
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