On 13 October 2015 at 21:43, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>
wrote:

> On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>> The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation being
>>> responsible for our consciousness, along with many other properties seen in
>>> physics.
>>>
>> Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit experiment
>> is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or particles. Nothing
>> to do with consciousness. As for the rest of physics??????
>>
>> The theory has survived numerous tests, without being disproven, which is
>>> all we can hope for as evidence for any theory.
>>>
>>
>> Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is not.
>> Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much less explain
>> how the universe came to exist long before consciousness emerged.
>
>
> Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not only the
> brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible that the brain
> utilises non-computable physics, in which case computationalism would be
> false. Is that what you believe?
>
>
> You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing emulable,
> and computationalism false. That would be the case if matter is primary and
> arithmetic merely a formal game.
>

Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter is
primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree.
They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves
like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg.
Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like
a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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