On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 13 October 2015 at 21:43, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett < <[email protected]> >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>>> The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation being >>>> responsible for our consciousness, along with many other properties seen in >>>> physics. >>>> >>> Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit >>> experiment is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or >>> particles. Nothing to do with consciousness. As for the rest of >>> physics?????? >>> >>> The theory has survived numerous tests, without being disproven, which >>>> is all we can hope for as evidence for any theory. >>>> >>> >>> Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is not. >>> Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much less explain >>> how the universe came to exist long before consciousness emerged. >> >> >> Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not only >> the brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible that the >> brain utilises non-computable physics, in which case computationalism would >> be false. Is that what you believe? >> >> >> You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing emulable, >> and computationalism false. That would be the case if matter is primary and >> arithmetic merely a formal game. >> > > Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter is > primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that > thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree. > They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves > like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. > Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like > a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle). > > > But the problem with what you say is that on this list "computationalism" > tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer (or a robot) that > thinks and acts like a human". Bruno claims to have proven that your > simple statement logically entails that all of physics and consciousness. > But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone "reject > computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the inferences > Bruno claims it entails. > I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the conclusions he draws from it. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
