On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 3:36 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> Well look into Bruno's theory if you want some possible answers.
>>
>
> ​Answers are a dime a dozen, correct answers are not. And Bruno doesn't
> even know what questions to ask, like, "what does the pronoun "you" refer
> to, or what does "free will" even mean, or does the word "God" mean
> anything other than a amorphous grey blob, or does a chain of "why"
> questions ever come to an end?".  Bruno hasn't even thought it important to
> ask these questions much less find the answers.
>

You said you had no answers to the question of why matter obeys physical
laws. Now that I show you one possibility, you say they are a dime a
dozen.


>
>
>> ​> ​
>> What you propose explains less and assumes more.
>> ​Y​
>> ou assume:
>> Physical universe -> Turing Machines -> Conscious Minds
>> ​ ​
>> +
>> ​ ​
>> Turing Machines that exist in math -> Unconscious zombies
>> Whereas, we might simply assume:
>> ​ ​
>> Turing Machines -> Conscious Minds
>>
>
> ​You conclude with "​
> Conscious Minds
> ​"
>

This is the conclusion of computationalism. Anytime there exist appropriate
Turing machines there will be consciousness. You assume only certain Turing
machines (those implemented by matter) can be consciouss, which is a
rejection of computationalism, it is an additional assumption.


> but I do NOT assume nor do I need to conclude that a conscious mind or the
> physical universe exist because I know both from direct experience.
>

This is an assumption (but perhaps you are blind to it being an
assumption). You cannot assume the existence of the physical world from an
experience of a physical world, as our dreams and the movie The Matrix or
The Thirteenth Floor illustrate. You might conclude that your are part of a
well-behaved, ordered-structured or computation, but you cannot conclude
that this structure you experience is because you are made of matter and
inside a physical world.

Computationalism alone says you are not matter but  the computations that
implement your conscious state. You also have said two identical
computations do not result in two people, but are the implementation of the
same mind. From this you might conclude that you are everyone one of your
implementations across all the many worlds or possible physical worlds. But
computationalism also tells us the substrate is of no relevance, you can
make computers out of pulleys, twigs, water pipes, etc. In effect, the
relations between registers in some silicon chip, or relations between
neurons, or electrons, form computations. So why not go the last mile and
accept that you can even build computers out of relations between integers,
or between other objects in math?  Do you not make the same error Searle
does when he says only biological cells can make conscious minds? Since the
physical world is in essense identical and isomorphic to some mathematical
object, you are saying "only relations created within this mathematical
structure (but no other mathematical structures) can be conscious.


>
> ​>> ​
>>> this simulation is being done
>>> ​ ​
>>> by your physical brain. So physics is simulating
>>> ​ ​
>>> mathematics and NOT mathematics
>>> ​ ​
>>> simulating
>>> ​ ​
>>> physics.
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> In this case, yes, a physical process is simulating the properties of a
>> (relatively) abstract mathematical object.
>>
>
> ​
> And that is the one and only type of
> ​ ​
> mathematical object
> ​ ​
> there is any evidence for.
>

What about the >10^500 other models of physics implied by string theory? If
those Googols of other mathematical structures exist, what do you think is
so special about them that makes them exist but not structures defined by
different sets of equations?

Maybe other types exist, and maybe Harry Potter does too but there is no
> evidence for either. Well
> ​ OK​
> ....
> ​maybe I've overstated my case, ​
> the 2 slit experiment is some evidence that many worlds exist, and if
>  an​
>  ​
> infinite number of them
> ​exist ​
> then Harry Potter
> ​
> might too
> ​. ​B
> ut even many
> ​worlds​
>  can't help with
> ​conjuring ​
> non-simulated mathematical objects
> ​ into existence​
>

Do you think we are just extraordinarily lucky that the one universe you
suppose to exist happened to had laws that were amenable to life?


>
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> the other postulated universes of the string theory landscape possess the
>> same ontological properties as mathematical objects: we can learn about
>> them from this universe, but only via simulation. We can't affect them, and
>> they can't affect us,
>>
>
> ​If that were true and ​we
> can't
> ​
> effect them and they can't affect us
> ​ then it would not be science it would be philosophy or even worse
> theology.
>

There are plenty of things in science we cannot effect and cannot effect
us, but are nonetheless important conclusions from legitimate theories:
- The past
- Beyond our cosmological horizon
- Things beyond our past/future light cones
- Branches of the wave function that have split off
- Other pockets/bubbles of inflation
- Other universes with different laws implied by string theory

Are these things philosophy/theology?


> But it isn't true.
>  if strings exist (a big if) then every time you move your finger you
> effect the strings in your finger, and if the strings were different
> physics would be different and if physics were different
> chemistry would be ​different and if chemistry were different you would be
> different.
>
>

I was talking about the other physics of other possible string theories.
See Susskind's The Cosmic Landscape.


> ​> ​
>> Why not review the current evidence?
>>
>
> ​If I ever run across evidence that computations can be made without the
> use of matter that obeys the laws of physics I make a solemn promise to
> review it.   ​
>

Do you think if other types of physics are possible (such as other
equations of string theory) it is possible in theory that computers could
be built there?

If so, that is evidence of computers not made of the matter you and I are
familiar with, but ruled by altogether different equations.


>
> ​
>>> ​>> ​
>>> Perhaps mathematics comes from a desire humans have to develop a
>>> language that is especially good at describing the workings of physics.​
>>> It's true as you pointed out that a lot of higher very abstract
>>> mathematics seems to have little or nothing to do with physics, but like
>>> any language once it is developed mathematics can be used to write fiction
>>> as well as nonfiction, perhaps a lot of it is like a mathematical Harry
>>> Potter novel.
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> What do you believe is real,
>>
>
> ​John Clark is one example.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> and why?
>>
>
> ​I think therefore I am. And when I think differently matter changes and
> when matter changes I think differently. ​
>
>

So you believe in only that which you see?


>
>
>> ​> ​
>> What do you believe is unreal,
>>
>
> ​Harry Potter.​ And ideas that nobody or nothing has ever thought or ever
> will think, and patterns of behavior that matter will never perform.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> and why?
>>
>
> ​Just a hunch.​
>
>
So you deny the existence of anything you cannot see?

People who relied on their senses were apt to deny that the Earth moved, or
that other branches of the wave function were real. Why not take theories
(such as computationalism) as literally true, and see where they might go?


> ​> ​
>> Occam's razor applies. If mathematical objects exist, then the physical
>> universes exists as a mathematical object. One must explain what the
>> additional assumption of a physical universe adds or explains.
>
>
> Occam's razor applies. If
> ​physical​
>  objects exist, then the
> ​mathematical ​
> universes exists as a
> ​physical​
>  object. One must explain what the additional assumption of a
> ​mathematical​
>  universe adds or explains.
>

When I assume mathematical objects exist, I assume all self-consistent
mathematical objects exist. I can therefore dispense with any assumption of
inherent capriciousness to reality. A capriciousness you need to explain if
you believe some consistent mathematical objects exist, while others do
not. And moreover, why of all the millions of ways the universe might have
existed to kill any life in it, the one universe that does exist was not
that way.


>
> ​> ​
>> It
>> ​[physics] ​
>> fails to answer, why if there is only one or some physical universes that
>> exist
>> ​ ​
>> why those are exist while other, perfectly valid (from a mathematical
>> structure perspective) do not exist.
>
>
> ​If you think that mathematics is more fundamental than physics and if
> you think other physical laws have a perfectly valid mathematical structure
> then it is your responsibility and not mine to explain why they do not
> exist!
>

I think they do exist. Why do you think they don't?


> The obvious explanation is that having a perfectly valid mathematical
> structure may be necessary for existence but it is not sufficient because
> physics is more fundamental than mathematics
>

Why is a universe defined by these laws reified, while others are not?


>
> ​> ​
>>  It answers why a universe having laws like ours has
>
>
> ​It does no such thing.​
>

See Leonard Susskind's Cosmic Landscape.


>
> ​> ​
>>  It also has issues with the mind-body problem,
>
>
> ​The greatest mystery about the
> mind-body problem
> ​ is figuring out what you would consider an adequate explanation. If I
> said X produced mind and X was mind you would protest and say that was just
> a tautology, and if it was not mind you would say "but X is not mind". I
> believe that mind-body problem ​fanboys forget that the chain of "why"
> questions either terminates with a brute fact or goes on forever. So after
> saying that consciousness is the way data feels like when it is being
> processed (by matter) there may not be anything more to be said.
>

Take out the "by matter" and tell me why that changes what data should feel
like when its processed. The Church-Turing thesis says that it is
impossible for any computation (or program) to know what hardware it is
running on. You think that programs can violate the Church-Turing thesis,
and know that they are implemented by atoms, rather than some other
mathematical structure.

Are you 100% certain you are executed by the quarks and electrons of the
standard model, and not some alternate exotic form of stuff from some
entirely different universe ruled by other equations?



>
>
>> ​> ​
>> and fails to offer any answer for why the universe exists at all.
>
>
> ​I suggest ​ you read "
> A Universe from Nothing
> ​"​
> by Lawrence M. Krauss
> ​, it doesn't explain why there is something rather than nothing but it
> does explain the enormous progress physics has made in just the last 20
> years or so in explaining why there is a lot rather than very little. Pure
> mathematics has made zero progress on this matter in the same time. ​
>
>

I beg to differ. And Krauss's book is mistitled. The vaccuum Krauss says
the universe came from is far from "nothing".


>
> ​> ​
>> what is primary? Why do our thoughts exist? Why do they appear to
>> correspond to a well-ordered structure? Where does mathematical knowledge
>> come from? This theory offers no explanation.
>
>
> ​Do you really think Bruno has done any better at answering these
> problems, or any problems?​
>
>

Yes.


>
>
>> ​> ​
>> It
>> ​[mathematics] ​
>> answers the mind-body problem,
>
>
> ​That is news to me! So then what is the answer?​
>
>

One's consciousness is the result of infinite programs that implement the
same computational state and the material universe is only apparent.


>
> ​> [mathematics]
>> explains why we have QM-like laws
>
>
> ​I can do the same thing. If mathematics is a language humans have devised
> to explain how the physical world works then the mathematical theory ​of
> quantum mechanics had to be the way it is or it wouldn't correctly describe
> the way the physical world works. And nobody would be crazy enough to come
> up with quantum mechanics from pure mathematics, instead experimental
> observation of the physical world determined what the mathematics in
> quantum theory should be.
>

Russel Standish and Bruno Marchal both recovered a quantum reality from
information theory and self-reference logic alone, respectively.

I think you might have missed this because you got held up arguing nonsense
about step 3 for the past five years.


>
>
>> ​> ​
>> and offers hope of deriving laws of physics from pure number theory.
>
>
> ​Hope is good, but as of September 13 2015 there is not even a hint of
> such a thing.​
>
> ​
>
>
>
See above.

Jason

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