On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 1:08 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 11:20 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > >> There is no evidence physical objects change. >> > > Be honest now, do you really believe that remark deserves a response? > > I wonder whether your e-mail deserves a response when you dishonestly subvert the original message's content and references. I can point you to sources/data, but can't make you read them nor think about them. Is that my fault or your own? > > > >> Most of reality we cannot observe. I'm comfortable with there being many >> things outside our small sphere of observability. Why aren't you? >> > > If something is outside my > > sphere of observability > then > for me to > > take it seriously > > I insist I understand WHY it is > > outside my > > sphere of observability > . > > I clearly understand why objects more distant than 13.8 billion light > years are outside my sphere of observability > > so I take them seriously, but if calculations without matter that obeys > the laws of physics do exist nobody has been able to explain to me why I > can't observe them, so until somebody shows me such a calculation or > > explains why I can't see them > I > can't take > > the idea > > seriously. > It should be pretty clear why other universes and platonic objects are outside your sphere of observability. > > >>> >> >>> I think there was a 100% chance that the universe I live in would be a >>> universe amenable to life, >>> >> >> > >> Read "The Cosmic Landscape". >> > > Why, does Susskind say there is less than a > > 100% chance that the universe I live in would be a universe amenable to > life > ? > He lays out a convincing case that the probability that any possible string-theory universe would not be expected to be capable of supporting life, which suggests that many universes with different laws exist. This is science's most-accepted answer for explaining the apparent fine-tuning observed in the physics of our universe. > > >> >>> I >>> deny anything >>> that contradicts experimental results. >>> >> >> > >> So then you have no reason to deny other universes which are by >> definition unobservable. >> > > I never said I did, in fact I said more than once that I thought Many > Worlds was the best > (perhaps least wrong would be more accurate) > > quantum interpretation > that I know of, > but that doesn't prove it's correct. > > > > >> If you believe 2 + 2 = 4, >> > > I do but apparently you do not, you said a calculator or anything > physical is simulating arithmetic so all you can believe is that simulated > 2 and simulated 2 is equal to simulated 4. > > 2 + 2 = 4, and we know that because our simulations of 2 + 2 turn come out to equal 4. > > >> > >> then you should also believe the function F defined as F(x) = x + 2, will >> return 4 when given input x = 2. And if you believe this, then you should >> also believe there is a function P(s) which when given s_1 as encoding the >> state of the tape and registers of a Turing machine returns a number s_2 >> encoding the state of the tape and registers after the Turing machine >> advances by one step. And if you believe in such functions like P, you also >> the function P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ...)))) implements N steps of a Turing >> machine initialized with state s_1 and returns s_n. These functions exist, >> and compute as surely as F(x) adds 2 to x. >> > > A function "will" do absolutely nothing, in the future the function will > be exactly the same as it is right now. A function can not perform a > calculation and neither can a definition, but a microprocessor made of > matter that obeys the laws of physics can. > If you think: 2 + 2 = 4, independently of you, me or anything else, then you should by extension believe that P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ...)))) = s_n independently of you, me, or anything else. Therefore the truth of "P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ...)))) = s_n" implies the existence of the computation of n steps by a Turing machine defined by P on input s_1. > > > >> > >>>> >> >>>> >>>> The Church-Turing thesis says that it is impossible for any computation >>>> (or program) to know what hardware it is running on. >>>> >>> >>> >> >>> It's not impossible at all, the John Clark program knows it is being >>> run on 3 pounds of grey goo. >>> >> >> > >> He doesn't. As he said earlier, he doesn't know whether or not Nick >> Bostrom is right. >> > > If > Nick Bostrom is right > then > the John Clark program is > STILL > being run on 3 pounds of grey goo > , it's just that the > 3 pounds of grey goo > is being run on a computer at a higher level. Computer X may be > simulating computer Y which is simulating computer Z which is running the > John Clark program, but computer Z is still running the John Clark program. > You still can't know that, because the computer might just be implementing your mind program directly, rather than simulating all the details of the grey goo between your ears. If computationalism is true, then to be able to know that you are grey goo, rather than a silicon computer, violates the Church-Turing thesis. > > >>>> > >>>> the material universe is only apparent. >>> >>> >>> >> >>> how would things be different if the >>> material universe >>> was not >>> only apparent >>> ? >>> >> >> > >> It wouldn't be any different. But the material universe would be >> superfluous and add nothing to the theory. Just like the hypothesized >> physical world adds nothing in the context of Leibniz's Pre-established >> harmony. >> > > I agree, therefore the words > > "only apparent" that you use above has no meaning. > I'm glad you agree that the idea of a primary physical universe is as meaningless as Leibniz's pre-established harmony. > > >> >>>> > >>>> >> >>>> >>>> Russel Standish and Bruno Marchal both recovered a quantum reality from >>>> information theory and self-reference logic alone, respectively. >>>> >>> >>> >> >>> Extra virgin, triple distilled, premium grade *BULLSHIT!!! * >>> >> >> > >> Your bold-faced text and explanation points were extra convincing. >> > > Yes I thought so too that's why I did it, not that much convincing is > necessary; anybody who had done half of what you claimed would be not just > the greatest scientists who ever lived but the greatest human being who > ever lived times 1000. And I just don't think Russell or Bruno are in that > category. > It takes about 100 years on average, before the new scientific discoveries bubble down to be common knowledge. (See Copernicus, Darwin, Everett). Maybe in 100 years, people will look upon you as we now look at the Nobel prize committee who thought Einstein's theory of relativity was too radical of an idea to be worthy of the prize. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
