On 14 Oct 2015, at 04:04, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to
computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not
possible to make a computer that behaves like a human because
there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger Penrose),
or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves like a
human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle).
But the problem with what you say is that on this list
"computationalism" tends to mean much
more than, "you can make a computer
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human". Bruno claims to
have proven that your simple statement logically entails that all
of physics and consciousness. But that is not so generally
accepted and so when someone "reject computationalism" here, it
may be they are just rejecting the inferences Bruno claims it
entails.
I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the
conclusions he draws from it.
But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not
true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism
disagree." Those who reject (extended)
computationalism, may very well agree.
If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended
conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's
argument is wrong.
Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and
others have done.
I don't think you did, except by invoking the use of Occam Razor, but
then all applied theories can be refuted in that way. Modern physics
has not refuted logically Ptolemeaus cycles, which are indeed
projectively consistent. Your strategy added magic (non Turing
emulable) actuality to the computations.
Bruno
Brent
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