On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 14 Oct 2015, at 05:50, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> >> On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker < <[email protected]> >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker < <[email protected]> >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ... >>>>> Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether matter >>>>> is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that >>>>> thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree. >>>>> They believe either that is not possible to make a computer that behaves >>>>> like a human because there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. >>>>> Roger Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that behaves >>>>> like >>>>> a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg. John Searle). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But the problem with what you say is that on this list >>>>> "computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a computer >>>>> (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human". Bruno claims to have >>>>> proven that your simple statement logically entails that all of physics >>>>> and >>>>> consciousness. But that is not so generally accepted and so when someone >>>>> "reject computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the >>>>> inferences Bruno claims it entails. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the >>>> conclusions he draws from it. >>>> >>>> >>>> But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are not >>>> true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that thinks and >>>> acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree." Those who >>>> reject (extended) computationalism, may very well agree. >>>> >>> >>> If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the extended >>> conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show where Bruno's >>> argument is wrong. >>> >>> >>> Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and others >>> have done. >>> >>> >> I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this? >> >> >> No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the >> arguments. >> >> 1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't instantiate >> consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and doesn't logic entail >> its conclusion. In fact the whole MGA is an argument from incredulity. >> > > The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X by Y > pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording shows. Therefore > I don't see how one could argue (assuming computationalism) that a > recording invokes the computation one presumes is necessary to instantiate > a conscious state. > > >> Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio to >> prove computationalism is false. >> > > So then what is his theory of mind? > > >> >> 2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while isolated. He >> tries to make this plausible by supposing that his scenario takes place as >> a dream; but this is not convincing. Even a dream needs prior experience >> of an outside world. >> > > Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that it could > be isolated from the outside world? > > >> So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist >> independent of an external world. It may be that physics can be derived >> from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self-evaluation exists in >> arithmetic. For the theory to work it must produce a world to be conscious >> of, and so far it doesn't do that. Bruno just writes things like, IF comp >> is true then physics must follow. But that's like saying IF Christianity >> is true Jesus will return. >> > > There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism. The > Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate all human > behaviors. A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea that we can > have no reliable knowledge of our own conscious states + Church-Turing > Thesis gives you computationalism. > > >> >> 3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is no >> reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical abstraction. A >> related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic is infinite in order to >> use Godel's theorems about what a system cannot prove about itself. But >> physics doesn't need infinities, they are just calculational conveniences. >> > > Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of > mathematics as we know it. I think it is an extreme length to go to reject > the UDA, to say there is a biggest number to which 1 cannot be added to. > > > Actually, Robinson Arithmetic is consistent with ultrafinitism. So, > logically, ultrafinitism is not a threat for comp at the ontological level. > Of course, to get physics, we need to interview non ultra-finitist > observers, as they are mute on almost all interesting questions, so Peter > Jones argument could still be recuperated by NOT listening or taking into > account most observers existing in the least model of RA. But this met your > critics. > > I just point to the fact that a biggest number is not so much a logical > threat that I thought once. > > A good exercise: find a model of RA with a biggest natural number (of > course such a model will not please to an ultrafinitist). > 1. 0 is not the predecessor of any number 2. predecessor of x = predecessor of y -> x = y 3. Every number is 0 or a predecessor of a number 4. x - 0 = x 5. x - predecessor of y = predecessor of (x - y) 6. x * 0 = 0 7. x * predecessor of y = (x * y) - x > > Nelson wrote a book on predicative arithmetic, and defends the idea that > the exponentiation function n^x is not total. It can be interesting in > showing that ultrafinitism is really not relevant for any mechanistic > account of mind and nature. > What about when the biggest number isn't big enough to contain enough information to realize a conscious state? Jason > > > >> >> 4. Bruno leans heavily on saying his theory explains QM, but it's not >> clear to me that it's even consistent with QM. For example how is the >> operation of Shor's algorithm consistent with the multiple threads of the >> UDA? >> >> I think Bruce Kellet has also made some critiques of Bruno's argument. >> > > Bruce's argument is that computationalism is false, and arithmetical > realism is false. If you reject these, it is no conflict with the UDA, > whose logic depends on those assumptions. > > Your argument in #1 and #2, also rests implicity on a rejection of > computationslim. #1 implies the computations don't matter, and #2 implies > the right computations don't matter if they are isolated. > > >> It is a red herring to ask "where is the error" because I don't think his >> argument is a fallacy; I think it is less than logic entailment. >> > > You can dispute the assumptions (computationalism, infinity, arithmetical > realism, etc.) but if you reject infinity or arithmetical realism, you must > also reject Church-Turing's thesis, and it's difficult to make sense of > computationalism if you can no longer define computation or computability. > So if you accept computationalism, you are implicitly accepting infinity > and arithmetical realism. Given this, the rest of Bruno's result is a > logical proof, which is either correct or has an error. > > Jason > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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