On 15 Oct 2015, at 03:59, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 14 Oct 2015, at 05:50, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed
to computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not
possible to make a computer that behaves like a human because
there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger
Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that
behaves like a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg.
John Searle).
But the problem with what you say is that on this list
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make a
computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human". Bruno
claims to have proven that your simple statement logically
entails that all of physics and consciousness. But that is not
so generally accepted and so when someone "reject
computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the
inferences Bruno
claims it entails.
I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the
conclusions he draws from it.
But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are
not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot) that
thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to computationalism
disagree." Those who reject (extended) computationalism, may
very well agree.
If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the
extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show
where Bruno's argument is wrong.
Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and
others have done.
I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?
No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the
arguments.
1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and
doesn't logic entail its conclusion. In fact the whole MGA is an
argument from incredulity.
The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given X
by Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording
shows. Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming
computationalism) that a recording invokes the computation one
presumes is necessary to instantiate a conscious state.
Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the reductio
to prove computationalism is false.
So then what is his theory of mind?
2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while
isolated. He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his
scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not convincing. Even
a dream needs prior experience of an outside world.
Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that
it could be isolated from the outside world?
So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist
independent of an external world. It may be that physics can be
derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough to say that self-
evaluation exists in arithmetic. For the theory to work it must
produce a world to be conscious of, and so far it doesn't do that.
Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then physics must
follow. But that's like saying IF Christianity is true Jesus will
return.
There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism. The
Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate all
human behaviors. A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea
that we can have no reliable knowledge of our own conscious states
+ Church-Turing Thesis gives you computationalism.
3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is
no reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical
abstraction. A related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic
is infinite in order to use Godel's theorems about what a system
cannot prove about itself. But physics doesn't need infinities,
they are just calculational conveniences.
Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of
mathematics as we know it. I think it is an extreme length to go to
reject the UDA, to say there is a biggest number to which 1 cannot
be added to.
Actually, Robinson Arithmetic is consistent with ultrafinitism. So,
logically, ultrafinitism is not a threat for comp at the ontological
level. Of course, to get physics, we need to interview non ultra-
finitist observers, as they are mute on almost all interesting
questions, so Peter Jones argument could still be recuperated by NOT
listening or taking into account most observers existing in the
least model of RA. But this met your critics.
I just point to the fact that a biggest number is not so much a
logical threat that I thought once.
A good exercise: find a model of RA with a biggest natural number
(of course such a model will not please to an ultrafinitist).
1. 0 is not the predecessor of any number
2. predecessor of x = predecessor of y -> x = y
3. Every number is 0 or a predecessor of a number
4. x - 0 = x
5. x - predecessor of y = predecessor of (x - y)
6. x * 0 = 0
7. x * predecessor of y = (x * y) - x
I see a theory, not a model.
I will solve the problem. It might be an opportunity to say a bit more
of what is a model. But I have not much time those days (heavy
scheduling up to the end of october, sorry).
Nelson wrote a book on predicative arithmetic, and defends the idea
that the exponentiation function n^x is not total. It can be
interesting in showing that ultrafinitism is really not relevant for
any mechanistic account of mind and nature.
What about when the biggest number isn't big enough to contain
enough information to realize a conscious state?
You can guess that the biggest number is very big. Being the biggest
number k you have the truth (in such a model of RA) of all the
propositions:
k > 0
k > s(0)
k > s(s(0)
k > s(s(s(0)))
...
Bruno
Jason
4. Bruno leans heavily on saying his theory explains QM, but it's
not clear to me that it's even consistent with QM. For example how
is the operation of Shor's algorithm consistent with the multiple
threads of the UDA?
I think Bruce Kellet has also made some critiques of Bruno's
argument.
Bruce's argument is that computationalism is false, and
arithmetical realism is false. If you reject these, it is no
conflict with the UDA, whose logic depends on those assumptions.
Your argument in #1 and #2, also rests implicity on a rejection of
computationslim. #1 implies the computations don't matter, and #2
implies the right computations don't matter if they are isolated.
It is a red herring to ask "where is the error" because I don't
think his argument is a fallacy; I think it is less than logic
entailment.
You can dispute the assumptions (computationalism, infinity,
arithmetical realism, etc.) but if you reject infinity or
arithmetical realism, you must also reject Church-Turing's thesis,
and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can no
longer define computation or computability. So if you accept
computationalism, you are implicitly accepting infinity and
arithmetical realism. Given this, the rest of Bruno's result is a
logical proof, which is either correct or has an error.
Jason
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