On 15 Oct 2015, at 10:27, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 15 Oct 2015, at 1:41 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 14 Oct 2015, at 05:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
Standard computationalism does not say anything about whether
matter is primary or not. It says that you can make a computer
(or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed
to computationalism disagree. They believe either that is not
possible to make a computer that behaves like a human because
there is non-computable physics in the brain (eg. Roger
Penrose), or that it is possible to make a computer that
behaves like a human but not one that thinks like a human (eg.
John Searle).
But the problem with what you say is that on this list
"computationalism" tends to mean much more than, "you can make
a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a human".
Bruno claims to have proven that your simple statement
logically entails that all of physics and consciousness. But
that is not so generally accepted and so when someone "reject
computationalism" here, it may be they are just rejecting the
inferences Bruno claims it entails.
I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean computationalism plus the
conclusions he draws from it.
But with that extended meaning, the following two sentences are
not true: "It says that you can make a computer (or a robot)
that thinks and acts like a human. Those opposed to
computationalism disagree." Those who reject (extended)
computationalism, may very well agree.
If someone believes computationalism does not lead to the
extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on them to show
where Bruno's argument is wrong.
Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily - which I and
others have done.
I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed this?
No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of the
arguments.
1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity and
doesn't logic entail its conclusion. In fact the whole MGA is an
argument from incredulity. Mallah, who has his own version of the
argument, takes the reductio to prove computationalism is false.
We suppose that when you survive with an artificial brain, this due
to the fact that the physical implementation of brain implements
the relevant computations, and not some other magical phenomenon
added to the description.
In that frame the recording cannot be conscious because it does not
constitute an implementation of the relevant computations.
The core question here is what it means to "implement a
computation". It can be argued that a recording (which cannot handle
counterfactuals) implements a computation, or that any system with
multiple states implements a computation under a particular mapping.
A computation is any behavior of a universal machine/number when feed
some (possibly empty) data. That behavior is isomorphic with some
(sigma-1) arithmetical relations.
I will come back on this. The exactness of the notion of
implementation is entirely due to the discreteness of the relation
involved.
A response to this is that such systems do not implement
computations that can interact with their environment. But what
about computations that do not interact with the substrate of their
implementation, but give rise to dreaming consciousnesses or (so
Brent won't object) entire virtual worlds?
They will be conscious, like the person supported by a brain in a vat.
Of course, such a person is handicaped if you want play soccer with
them, but it is not impossible to play soccer in a virtual
environment, if you manage to interface them with the right "video-
game)like" environment. The consciousness itself is in arithmetic, in
a non time dependent way.
There seems no good reason to say that these computations are not
implemented; and if they are, it is equivalent to saying that they
are implemented by virtue of their status as platonic entities,
since the presence of a physical substrate becomes irrelevant.
Yes. I agree. A machine cannot see by introspection if she is run by a
Physical Reality emulating or implementing an interpreter LISP
emulating RA emulating a DIOPH. POLYNO. emulating a topological
computer emulating a program FORTRAN emulating a game of life pattern
emulating them, from RA emulating a an interpreter LISP emulating RA
emulating a DIOPH. POLYNO. emulating a topological computer emulating
a program FORTRAN emulating a game of life pattern emulating them.
Only a computationalist believing in *non Turing emulable* primary
matter playing a role in consciousness, and not playing a role in
consciousness (to remain computationalist), can argue that there is a
difference, but he is inconsistent.
Bruno
2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while
isolated. He tries to make this plausible by supposing that his
scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not convincing. Even
a dream needs prior experience of an outside world.
As you say: prior. But then the physical supervenience is already
false, as it asks for attributing consciousness s at the time of
the physical emulation.
So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can exist
independent of an external world.
Which world? Comp assume enough to make sense of 2+2=4. No more. It
is a priori, at the start agnostic on Matter and God(s).
It may be that physics can be derived from arithmetic, but it is
not enough to say that self-evaluation exists in arithmetic. For
the theory to work it must produce a world to be conscious of,
I guess you mean a physical world, but then you beg the question.
and so far it doesn't do that.
It does, and it justifies already a quantum quantization for the
measure one.
Bruno just writes things like, IF comp is true then physics must
follow. But that's like saying IF Christianity is true Jesus will
return.
First, UDA proves that if comp is true, then physics *must* follow.
There is no must in the second sentence.
Second, we get the entire propositional "jesus", so it is there.
Then given that it is the only precise theory explaining both
Matter and Mind, and their relations, well, if you have another
one, I am listening.
3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that there is
no reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a hypothetical
abstraction.
Peter Jones argument does not take into account the MGA (step 8).
A related criticism is that Bruno assumes arithmetic is infinite
in order to use Godel's theorems about what a system cannot prove
about itself. But physics doesn't need infinities, they are just
calculational conveniences.
Physics miss consciousness. It is not addressed at all. We don't do
physics. We do theology in the mechanist frame.
Physics assumes a physical reality, without explanation what that
is and where it comes from. And it eliminates consciousness.
4. Bruno leans heavily on saying his theory explains QM, but it's
not clear to me that it's even consistent with QM. For example
how is the operation of Shor's algorithm consistent with the
multiple threads of the UDA?
Why would Shor's algorithm be inconsistent?
But physics is shown not to explain why we can verify from the
first person view any physical prediction, except by invoking a
primary ultrafinistic universe + something non turing emulable in
the mind. And this without any theory of mind. It eliminates the
mind.
I think Bruce Kellet has also made some critiques of Bruno's
argument. It is a red herring to ask "where is the error" because
I don't think his argument is a fallacy; I think it is less than
logic entailment.
It is logical entailment up to the later use of Occam razor, that
we always have to use when we apply a theory to a possible reality.
You don't refute the argument or I miss something.
Bruno
Brent
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