On 10/13/2015 10:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 11:59 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 8:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 10:21 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 7:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 6:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Oct 13, 2015 at 6:16 PM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 14 October 2015 at 09:46, Brent Meeker
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 10/13/2015 3:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
Standard computationalism does not say
anything about whether matter is primary or
not. It says that you can make a computer (or
a robot) that thinks and acts like a human.
Those opposed to computationalism disagree.
They believe either that is not possible to
make a computer that behaves like a human
because there is non-computable physics in
the brain (eg. Roger Penrose), or that it is
possible to make a computer that behaves like
a human but not one that thinks like a human
(eg. John Searle).
But the problem with what you say is that on
this list "computationalism" tends to mean
much more than, "you can make a computer (or a
robot) that thinks and acts like a human".
Bruno claims to have proven that your simple
statement logically entails that all of
physics and consciousness. But that is not so
generally accepted and so when someone "reject
computationalism" here, it may be they are
just rejecting the inferences Bruno claims it
entails.
I take Bruno's term "comp" to mean
computationalism plus the conclusions he draws
from it.
But with that extended meaning, the following two
sentences are not true: "It says that you can make
a computer (or a robot) that thinks and acts like a
human. Those opposed to computationalism disagree."
Those who reject (extended) computationalism, may
very well agree.
If someone believes computationalism does not lead to
the extended conclusions Bruno drew from it, it is on
them to show where Bruno's argument is wrong.
Or why it's conclusion doesn't follow necessarily -
which I and others have done.
I missed this. Could you point to the posts where you showed
this?
No, I don't keep posts that long, but I can summarize some of
the arguments.
1. Bruno's argument that recapitulating a recording doesn't
instantiate consciousness is a mere argument from incredulity
and doesn't logic entail its conclusion. In fact the whole
MGA is an argument from incredulity.
The computations involved in playing back a recording of a given
X by Y pixel image are constant regardless of what the recording
shows. Therefore I don't see how one could argue (assuming
computationalism) that a recording invokes the computation one
presumes is necessary to instantiate a conscious state.
"Presume" is the operative word there.
Okay, I think we agree then. You can have a theory that says a
recording is consciousness, but then that isn't computationalism. And
if it isn't computationalism then you can't use that as an argument
against the logic used in the UDA which starts from the assumption of
computationalism.
Mallah, who has his own version of the argument, takes the
reductio to prove computationalism is false.
So then what is his theory of mind?
Dunno, probably physicalism. But he's not obliged to have an
alternative in order to reject one premise of a reductio.
I'm nor familiar enough with his argument to comment.
2. Bruno's argument depends on the MG being conscious while
isolated. He tries to make this plausible by supposing that
his scenario takes place as a dream; but this is not
convincing. Even a dream needs prior experience of an
outside world.
Do you deny the possibility of mind uploading on the account that
it could be isolated from the outside world?
Yes. A brain in a vat with no connections would not be able to
sustain consciousness.
Can you dream?
Even when you're dreaming you are still interacting with your
environment. And complete sensory deprivation leads to the mind going
into loops.
So on reflection it is not plausible that consciousness can
exist independent of an external world. It may be that
physics can be derived from arithmetic, but it is not enough
to say that self-evaluation exists in arithmetic. For the
theory to work it must produce a world to be conscious of,
and so far it doesn't do that. Bruno just writes things
like, IF comp is true then physics must follow. But that's
like saying IF Christianity is true Jesus will return.
There is a lot of independent evidence for computationalism.
Name some that's not also compatible with physicalism.
Cochlear implants and artificial retinas give evidence toward multiple
realizability, and therefore, against mind-brain identity theory.
Mind/brain identity theory is only /*functional*/ identity, it doesn't
assume material identity.
They show that it is functional equivalence, rather than
material/compositional equivalence that matters.
Right. But that doesn't prove that you can dispense with mater and the
material environment.
Since computers can realize any finite function, then assuming there
are no necessary infinities within the brain, computers can realize
any functional state the brain is able to realize.
Yes, that's Bruno's argument, but first it is not a question of a
"functional state" but of a process a computation. This process must
include the interaction with the environment. So what the computer must
realize is a simulated world in which a simulated consciousness exists.
But then this is no longer a reversal of physics and psychology - it is
just a mapping of both of them to a different simulated world.
For physicalism to be correct, you have to believe either that
functional states are irrelevant to consciousness, or that physics can
instantiate functional states which Turing machines cannot.
The Church-Turing Thesis means a computer can perfectly replicate
all human behaviors.
First, it's a "thesis", not a fact.
It's as well accepted as any theory in physics.
Second, it doesn't mean that an abstract computation can replicate
human behavior.
It does. But you would say that it would result in a zombie.
Not at all. If the computer can interact with the world and replicate
human like behavior in that world I expect that it is conscious.
If human cogitation is Turing emulable, it may still have to be
physically realized,
The Church-Turing thesis says nothing about computers having to be
built out of electrons and quarks.
That's because CT is about an abstract idealization. Fluid dynamics
says nothing about fluids being made out of atoms and molecules, but it
doesn't follow that fluids exist without atoms and molecules.
which means its finite, which means the infinities of arithmetic
are not necessary to intelligence or consciousness.
I don't think infinities are necessary to consciousness. It just so
happens that in arithmetical realism, there are infinite numbers of
platonically existing computations.
A rejection of zombies, or a rejection of the idea that we can
have no reliable knowledge of our own conscious states +
Church-Turing Thesis gives you computationalism.
But what do you mean by "computationalism"?
That the proper computation results in consciousness.
The computation written down on paper or realized in a world which it
interacts with?
Just that consciousness can be instantiated by an artifact?...by a
digital computer? Or does "computationalism" imply all the
inferences Bruno argues for, but which are not commonly accepted.
My above insertion was that the "No zombie principal" + "Church-Turing
thesis = true" -> computationalism. It is the UDA which says
computationalism -> the reversal. If the UDA is correct,
What does it mean "correct"? that there is a potentially infinite
computer running the UDA?
then transitively "No zombie principal" + "Church-Turing thesis =
true" -> the reversal.
3. Peter Jones wrote several critiques pointing out that
there is no reason to suppose a UDA exists, it's merely a
hypothetical abstraction. A related criticism is that Bruno
assumes arithmetic is infinite in order to use Godel's
theorems about what a system cannot prove about itself. But
physics doesn't need infinities, they are just calculational
conveniences.
Ultrafinitism is a fringe theory which leads to a break down of
mathematics as we know it. I think it is an extreme length to go
to reject the UDA, to say there is a biggest number to which 1
cannot be added to.
That's just your prejudice. Try reading Feng Ye and Jan
Mycielski. I think it's telling that you look at the mere
existence of alternative number theory as destroying "mathematics
as we know it". Mathematics is just a bunch of axiom/theorem
systems. There's no one really real mathematics any more than
there's one real language.
Well then, if there are many mathematics, and they are all equally
valid (as you say), then we inhabit the ones that contain Universal
Dovetailers.
An explanation that explains everything fails to explain at all.
4. Bruno leans heavily on saying his theory explains QM, but
it's not clear to me that it's even consistent with QM. For
example how is the operation of Shor's algorithm consistent
with the multiple threads of the UDA?
I think Bruce Kellet has also made some critiques of Bruno's
argument.
Bruce's argument is that computationalism is false, and
arithmetical realism is false. If you reject these, it is no
conflict with the UDA, whose logic depends on those assumptions.
Again it's not clear what you mean by computationalism. Bruce
can speak for himself, but I think he agrees that strong AI is
possible.
Strong AI implies consciousness is substrate independent.
But it doesn't imply that it is independent of all substrate or
independent of an environment.
But I thought Bruce argued against consciousness being derivable from
mathematical computations, which would mean consciousness is substrate
dependent: that it depends on physically implemented Turing machines.
There's no such thing as a physically implemented Turing machine. A
Turing machine is an abstract idealization.
Your argument in #1 and #2, also rests implicity on a rejection
of computationslim. #1 implies the computations don't matter, and
#2 implies the right computations don't matter if they are isolated.
It is a red herring to ask "where is the error" because I
don't think his argument is a fallacy; I think it is less
than logic entailment.
You can dispute the assumptions (computationalism, infinity,
arithmetical realism, etc.) but if you reject infinity or
arithmetical realism, you must also reject Church-Turing's thesis,
Why? Arithmetic is system of propositions. Whether it is real or
not has no effect on Church-Turing.
Then you should be equally happy to have your brain implemented by
"unreal computations" as "real computations" :-)
I might be equally happy if my brain and whole world were implemented in
computations. Would you be happy to have your brain replaced by an
abstract computation. If so then your present self can be dispensed
with since your brain already exists (in the mathematical sense) as an
abstract computation in Peano arithmetic.
and it's difficult to make sense of computationalism if you can
no longer define computation or computability. So if you accept
computationalism, you are implicitly accepting infinity and
arithmetical realism. Given this, the rest of Bruno's result is a
logical proof, which is either correct or has an error.
No, you missed the point that it is not a logical proof. It's an
argument from incredulity.
"A Turing Machine either reaches a halting state or runs forever"
"A Turing Machine can emulate any other Turing machine"
"A Turing Machine has an unlimited tape"
None of the above items are true for physical approximations of Turing
machines. If these basic principals of computer science are not true
for physical Turing machines, then what kind of Turing machines are
they true for?
Hypothetical ones.
Is Computer Science founded on lies, or does it concern itself with a
recently-discovered mathematical object for which these statements are
true?
Hypotheses aren't lies unless you take them too seriously.
Brent
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