On 17 Oct 2015, at 21:53, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Oct 17, 2015 at 1:31 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
>>> Of the 10^500 string theory physics, maybe 1 in a
million or fewer are rich enough to support life.
>> If so then there are 10^494 universes rich enough to
support life, and there is a 100% probability that the universe I
live in is one of them.
> Which implies a high probability that other universes, ruled
by different laws, exist.
Obviously, except of course the physical law that makes you
conclude that there are 10^500 universes in the first place. So
what's your point?
>> If physical objects like a calculator or your brain don't
have access to numbers then you know nothing about numbers you only
know about simulated numbers.
> If the simulation is accurate, you gain accurate information
about that which is simulated.
A simulation is never 100% accurate,
This not correct. In Virtue of the digitalness, a simulation can be
100% accurate, notably when simulating a digital process. There is
word for "100% accurate simulation", we call that an emulation. The
models of RA emulates all computations. RA is obviously consistent, so
it has at least one model, and PA can prove that RA is consistent.
You can emulate in algol a fortran computation of the factorial
function. It will be 100 % accurate if there is no bug in your program.
All universal machine, in the non material sense of Church or Turing,
Post, Kleene, etc. can emulate, simulate exactly all other universal
machine, and the arithmetical reality (the standard model of
arithmetic) do that.
This does not make possible to extract the computations result
directly, as we live in a physical reality, and must implement the
computations in the physical reality to get that effect. But that
relative emulation of that process is emulated itself infinitely often
in arithmetic. So, here you make a constant confusion of level when
you come with the straw man argument that an arithmetical computation
cannot be used relatively to our physical history. True, but that does
not make the physical reality ontologically prior to the arithmetical
reality. The physical reality can still, and has to (by the UD
Argument), emerges from all computations going through our actual
state in arithmetic.
if they were absolutely identical there would be no point in doing
it because we already have the real one. I think that when a
physical object like your brain adds 2 and 2 it's not a simulation
at all and the 4 it produces is as real as integers get and is
exactly precisely 4. But you think it's just simulation so all you
know is that simulated 2 and simulated 2 is approximately 4, but
its exact value depends on how good the simulation is.
> If physical objects like a calculator or your brain do
have access to actual non-simulated numbers and if numbers are all
that's required to make a calculation then physical object should be
able to make arbitrarily large calculations instantly with no
expenditure of energy.
> Right that's the problem. The computations and their results
exist out there already. But they don't interact with the atoms of
our universe.
They don't interact with the atoms of our universe?! Why the
hell not, according to you those very atoms are made of nothing but
numbers!
>>> For us to arrange atoms in a way that corresponds to
these computations or results, we need to build physical simulations
of those computations.
>> So why can't you?
> What kind of mechanism are you proposing is possible to cause
atoms to arrange themselves into the final result of a long running
calculation?
You tell me. You're the one who insists that numbers pull the
strings on everything that happens in the physical world not me.
>>> you should by extension believe that P(P(P(P( ...
(s_1) ...)))) = s_n independently of you, me,
>> Those are some very nice ASCII characters you've typed
there, but the truth is I don't care if it's independent of you or
not because "P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ...)))) = s_n" can't make a
calculation nor can any sequence of ASCII characters, but a silicon
microprocessor can.
> You are conflating a computation with a physical
approximation/simulation
OK, your physical brain has run a approximation/simulation of
2 + 2 so now you know the answer is approximately 4, but it could be
3.9 or 4.1.
> of that computation.
"P(P(P(P( ... (s_1) ...)))) = s_n" can't perform a calculation
or a simulation or even an approximation because "P(P(P(P( ...
(s_1) ...)))) = s_n" is just a sequence of ASCII
characters. But a physical microprocessor can do all of those
things.
> I give up.
OK.
> You clearly aren't interested in learning.
I'm always willing to learn, but only from those who have
something true and interesting to teach.
You confess having not read the works, and you have not succeeded in
explaining why you stop in the early kindergarden stage, so, this is
gratuitously negative.
You involve yourself into an ontological commitment (that is religion)
about the existence of some mysterious non Turing emulable , nor FPI
recoverable, primary matter (never assumed primary even by the applied
physicists), and you defined a computation by a primary physical
implementation of a computation. This is obviously as much circular
than vague. So you do non-rigorous philosophy to pretext not studying
a precise formulation of a problem and its possible solution.
I am afraid that your position is just hopeless. You proceed like a
creationist, and indeed starting from assuming a primary physical
universe is equivalent with explaining the origin of its appearance by
"God made it".
I did not ever dreamed about someone confirming so well that strong
non-agnostic materialist atheism belong to fundamentalist religion.
You seem to avoid any thinking able to scratch your dogma. Well,
humans do that often. Thank you at least for making *this* point so
clearly. You were not the first, of course.
Bruno
John K Clark
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