On 30 Oct 2015, at 17:56, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:
I'll try again... fooling myself again in believing you're honest here
Oh dear, I feared that "bye" in your last post didn't mean
much.
> So let's pretend our "AI" is in fact a Nintendo Entertainment
System game... that game, can be run on a physical NES, or can be
run in an emulator running on a physical computer... or on an
emulator running on an emulator running on a physical computer...
That's OK provided one of 2 things is true:
1) The sequence of simulations of simulations of simulations
eventually terminates with a physical computer.
Amen.
Actually it could terminate in any Turing universal system, the
physical one (if they exist) or the arithmetical one, the group
theoretical one, the set theoretical one, the list-theoretical one,
the combinators, etc.
The computations are emulated in virtue of the truth of number
relationship, and emulation itself can be defined by a relation
between a universal number, another number (the data), and the
numbering of the steps of the computations (an injection in N). The
computation is in the truth of such relation, not in the description
of such relations (to avoid Bruce Kellet dismissing the semantic of
programs behavior and (self)-reference.
2) The sequence is infinite and never terminates; in which case
mathematics really would be more fundamental than physics.
If you think a little bit farer (than step 3, alas) you can expect
something close to this being a consequence of us surviving in Turing
physical machines: below our substitution level, the sequence is
infinite a priori. For any computation going through your states in
arithmetic, there is a more simpler, and more efficacious, yet bigger
one which do it to. (That can be deduce from speeding-up theorem in
theoretical computer science)
Bruno
> From the POV of the game, it is unable to distinguish those
cases
Agreed.
> Same thing with the AI, the information it has access to, it
cannot tell the ontological status of what that information
represent... those informations could come from a really real
ontological physical world... or an emulation of the really real
ontological physical world or an emulation of an emulation of the
really real ontological physical world.... it has no way to decide
the ontological status of that "external world".
Agreed.
John K Clark
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