On 05 Nov 2015, at 20:21, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Nov 5, 2015 at 4:15 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> it is true independently of me verify it or not. That is why
I can say that I am sure that Goldbach conjecture is true or not,
that Riemann hypothesis is true or not. I accept the excluded middle
I agree, but that doesn't guarantee that we will ever find a way
to determine if they are true or not even in theory.
But that is not relevant.
And truth alone can't DO anything,
If it is true that there is a continuation of my computational history
where I will want coffee, then it is true that I may want coffee,
independently of my ability to compute that state by myself, and,
independently of the fact that such a computation is run by this or
that universal number.
For a computaionalist: to say that physics must prevails, is like
saying that only this universal number plays a role, and if it is
another, then consciousness does not appear. But then how could I say
yes to a doctor who will not care about which universal nulber will
implement the relevant loop for my consciousness.
That idea can only be based on some non Turing emulable primary
matter, but computationalism explains why we do have that impression,
given that below our substitution level, we can see the trace of the
infinite set of computations going to my state, and that is like a
primary non emulable matter, without committing oneself ontologically.
If, you have to explain the role of that primary matter, and I doubt
you can do this without abandoning Digital Mechanism.
and yet we know for certain that stuff gets done.
I can admit that we know for certain that we are conscious. But
nothing more.
Without matter that obeys the laws of physics the truth or
falsehood of Goldbach or Riemann is irrelevant, neither can DO
diddly squat.
Proof?
>> But without access to matter that obeys the laws of physics
truth alone can't DO anything.
>Why?
Because of induction. In the entire history of the world nobody
has ever made even the simplest calculation without using matter
that obeys the laws of physics and nobody has even come close to
doing so; I therefore use induction to conclude that more likely
than not nobody ever will. As to why existence is organized in this
way I don't pretend to understand, all I know is that it probably
is.
Don't confuse "doing a physical computation" and "computations exists
in arithmetic".
With computationalism, we have to explain the phenomenology of the
first from the second.
>> The relationship that a truth has with another truth, or
even with a untruth, never changes, it's completely static. And
consciousness is not static and neither is intelligence.
> I never herad you defending the idea that time is primitive?
I don't know if time is a primitive
Then you should not use it in an argument.
or not but I do know that time is just one dimension, there are at
least 3 more.
> You are arguing aganist any notion of block universe, like
Prigogine, and Stephen Paul King.
If the block universe were homogeneous then neither consciousness
nor intelligence could exist but obviously it is not, there are
variations.
>> It would be trivially easy to write a program that would
generate all correct textbooks in mathematics and physics of 1000
pages or less, but it would be ASTRONOMICALLY more difficult to
generate *only* correct textbooks in mathematics and physics of 1000
pages or less; and it could not even be attempted without matter
that obeys the laws of physics.
> You confuse babel library with the universal dovetailer,
which write only correct programs,
I don't confuse a damn thing. Neither a "universal dovetailer"
nor anything else can write ONLY correct programs (or ONLY correct
anything) without the use of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
You keep confusing "physical computation" with "computation" in the
sense of Church, Post, Turing, ...
Bruno
John K Clark
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