On 06 Nov 2015, at 22:00, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Nov 5, 2015 at 4:02 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> Many-Worlds gives the best explanation for why
probabilities and not certainties exist at the quantum level that I
know of, and that and the fact that it doesn't need to define
"consciousness" or "observation" is why I like it.
> Everett still does need to explain observation,
No he does not because Everett says observation is not what causes
a universe to split it's simply a change, a change made in anything
will make it happen and it doesn't matter if it's a observation or
not. For Everett the universe splits whenever there is a change in
an observer but it also also happens whenever there is a change in a
non-observer. For Everett observers obey the exact same laws of
physics that non-observers do, but in Copenhagen observers obey
different laws, sort of like the ancient Greeks who thought the
physics on the Earth and the physics in the realm of the stars were
different. So unlike Everett Copenhagen needs to explain exactly
what a observation is and it has done a pretty poor job at doing
that. Is an ape good enough to make a observation and collapse the
wave function, what about a dog, or a cockroach, or a bacteria, or a
virus? Copenhagen needs to know what a observation is but doesn't.
Everett doesn't know either but he doesn't need to know.
You make my point. Everett does not need to know, *because* he assumes
mechanism, and uses a form of the first person indeterminacy (which he
called subjective probability, which is a misleading naming in a
context where we discuss also Bayes)
>> But I don't reject "FPI" in ANYTHING! I've known since I
was 2 that sometimes a person doesn't know what is going to happen
next.
>By a non intrinsic ignorance. But with self-duplication and/or
self-superposition, the ignorance is intrinsic.
It's exactly the same thing. If I receive stimuli from X I will
be the guy who received stimuli from X, if not
After what experiment? Where does stimuli X come from?
I will be the guy who did not receive stimuli from X. Apparently
you find this fact profound, I do not.
You were too much vague, here. You just ignore the point.
> Even an omniscient God cannot predict the result of self-
measurement in those cases.
Even an omniscient God cannot make the guy who received stimuli
from X the guy who did not receive stimuli from X.
But what made the stimuli X? If it is the lottery: God *can* know the
outcome. If it is a self-superposition or a self-duplication, he can't.
Apparently you find this fact profound, I do not.
The profound thing depends on the origin of the stimuli X.
Bruno
John K Clark
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