On 20/06/2016 3:10 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Jun 2016, at 02:25, Bruce Kellett wrote:
There is no hard problem ..... there is only confusion on the part of
Chalmers and those who follow him. I think Massimo Pigliucci gets it
right when he asks "What hard problem?",
(http://philosophynow.org/issues/99/What_Hard_Problem).
"I think that the idea of a hard problem of consciousness arises from
a category mistake. I think that in fact there is no real distinction
between hard and easy problems of consciousness, and the illusion
that there is one is caused by the pseudo-profundity that often
accompanies category mistakes."
A category mistake arise when, for example, you ask about the colour
of triangles. This mistake led Chalmers to endorse a form of dualism.
(And I think that ultimately you, Bruno, are also endorsing a subtle
dualism in your approach.)
?
Not at all. In the "final TOE", I assume only elementary arithmetic,
and computationalism at the meta-level. Materialist (in the weak sense
of believer in Matter) are forced to be dualist or eliminativist.
Not at all. You rely on the idea that all computations "exist" in
arithmetic; that requires that arithmetic "exists" in some sense that is
independent of the physical, or of minds that formulate mathematics. You
then invoke the universal dovetailer to actually execute all possible
programs. You have not actually ever made this into a sensible account
of anything. There is a fundamental confusion between map and territory
lurking behind everything that you say in this context.
The materialist (believer in physics as fundamental) is not forced to be
either dualist or eliminativist. You can only claim this on the basis
that computationalism is the only true theory. But this is what is in
dispute, so you can't use this to claim these consequences as a flaw in
a theory that does not start from computationalism.
Pigliucci then goes on the endorse the evolutionary account: "...Once
you have answered the how and why of consciousness, what else is
there to say?
In the case of consciousness, the wy is easy indeed. But the how is
very tricky, as digital mechanism illustrates.
As Pigliucci illustrates, the why is an easy consequence -- if you start
from the right place and do not confuse things by thinking only in terms
of digital mechanism.
"Ah!" exclaim Chalmers, Nagel and others, "You still have not told us
what it is like to be a bat (or a human being, or a zombie), so
there!" ... Of course an explanation isn't the same as an experience,
but that's because the two are completely independent categories. It
is obvious that I cannot experience what it is like to be you, but I
can potentially have a complete explanation of how and why it is
possible to be you.
This shift from consciousness to identity. A complete explanation of
why it is possible to be me, if it exists, makes only consciousness
even more mysterious.
Not at all. The complete neurophysiological account of you and your
brain is "you" -- that is all there is to it. What else does your "Yes,
doctor" thought experiment prove? There is nothing else to account for
-- nothing mysterious at all. "To ask for that explanation to also
somehow encompass the experience itself is both incoherent, and an
illegitimate use of the word 'explanation'."
See my answer to Clark. The relation first person consciousness with
third person relations is akin to the simpler case of the relation
between equation and surfaces, and then theories and models, and then
machines and private minds.
Then computer science explains this completely up to the matter
appearance or the sigma_1 measure problem.
To ask for that explanation to also somehow encompass the experience
itself is both incoherent, and an illegitimate use of the word
'explanation'."
Of course. Everybody agree here, but that is not what is done by the
philosopher of mind. We still want an explanation for the experience,
and computer science/mathematical logic provides it (at least a solid
embryo). The point is that it should be precise enough to get physics,
which it does, at the propositional level at least.
You have missed the point. You are still asking for an "explanation"
when there is nothing remaining to be explained -- incoherent, as
Pigliucci says.
He goes on to explain that this does not involve the elimination of
the very concept of consciousness or of the self.
Which are two different notion, and the self is many (the 1-self, the
3-self, the 1p-plural, etc.).
The problem with this conclusion by people like Churchland and
Dennett is that they are taking reductionism too far -- although
everything is ultimately made of quarks, and the like, obeying the
laws of physics, that does not mean that higher orders of explanation
are illegitimate or eliminable (the old mistake of positivism!).
Good, but then it became dualist. You need matter and arithmetic, + a
magic link.
Rubbish. No further explanation needed or possible ==> no dualism. You
are the dualist because you invoke the arithmetical realm as well as the
material realm to explain supervenience of consciousness on the physical
brain. To avoid dualism you have to abandon the arithmetical realm.
Concepts such as evolution, consciousness, qualia and so on, have a
definite role, but they are not somehow magical -- to attempt to
'explain' these things in reductionist terms is ultimately, as
Massimo says, a category mistake. ("Where consciousness is concerned,
the existence of the appearance is the reality".)
OK with this, and very well exemplified by computer science and
mathematical logic. But the material ontology just do not work, as it
is an invocation of something never seen to stop pursuing the
explanations. I understand it you want study the sky, but don't invoke
the sky to claim the mind-body problem has been solved.
I don't, I merely invoke the physical workings of the brain. There is
nothing more to it. Material ontology works just fine.
Bruce
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