On 20 Jun 2016, at 05:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 20/06/2016 3:10 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Jun 2016, at 02:25, Bruce Kellett wrote:
There is no hard problem ..... there is only confusion on the part
of Chalmers and those who follow him. I think Massimo Pigliucci
gets it right when he asks "What hard problem?", (http://philosophynow.org/issues/99/What_Hard_Problem
).
"I think that the idea of a hard problem of consciousness arises
from a category mistake. I think that in fact there is no real
distinction between hard and easy problems of consciousness, and
the illusion that there is one is caused by the pseudo-profundity
that often accompanies category mistakes."
A category mistake arise when, for example, you ask about the
colour of triangles. This mistake led Chalmers to endorse a form
of dualism. (And I think that ultimately you, Bruno, are also
endorsing a subtle dualism in your approach.)
?
Not at all. In the "final TOE", I assume only elementary
arithmetic, and computationalism at the meta-level. Materialist (in
the weak sense of believer in Matter) are forced to be dualist or
eliminativist.
Not at all. You rely on the idea that all computations "exist" in
arithmetic;
That is a theorem. I could add some nuance, like the use of Boolos
pseudo-term, but I say that a higher order relation exists when it can
be expressed in arithmetic (and proved or not by RA, PA, ZF, ...).
that requires that arithmetic "exists" in some sense that is
independent of the physical,
The assumption does not invoke any physical assumption. I assume
classical logic and
x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
x *0 = 0
x*(y + 1) = x*y + x
Nothing more, in the TOE (not in the meta-reasoning where I assume
mechanism, but that too is eventually translated in arithmetic).
or of minds that formulate mathematics.
In some particular philosophies. I don't do philosophy.
You then invoke the universal dovetailer to actually execute all
possible programs.
Its existence is a theorem of arithmetic (with Church-thesis in the
background).
You have not actually ever made this into a sensible account of
anything. There is a fundamental confusion between map and territory
lurking behind everything that you say in this context.
You are just insulting the academy. Obviously this is not the case,
except precisely when you say "yes" to the surgeon, as
computationalism is that at some description level of a digital thing,
we bet the map is precise enough to reconstitute the thing. We do that
with most numerical data in computer.
The materialist (believer in physics as fundamental) is not forced
to be either dualist or eliminativist. You can only claim this on
the basis that computationalism is the only true theory.
I have never claim that. I claim that if digital mechanism is correct
(menaing if I can survive with a digital brain) then ... If you think
there is an error in the UDA, just say it, and at which step. From the
discussion on QM, it seems you get the FPI, so it can't be no more
step 3, so which is it?
But this is what is in dispute,
It is my assumption. Mechanism is "my" theory. I work in that theory,
and prove theorem in that theory. You wiull not find one post where I
claim that comp is true.
so you can't use this to claim these consequences as a flaw in a
theory that does not start from computationalism.
I just say comp makes physicalism wrong. At no moement I said that
physicalism is wrong, unless we are in comp, with mutual consent. I
tell you I do not do philosophy. I show that comp is experimentally
testable, and that it would be judged plausibly if it was not rescaped
by Everett QM, or von Neuman quantum logic.
Pigliucci then goes on the endorse the evolutionary account:
"...Once you have answered the how and why of consciousness, what
else is there to say?
In the case of consciousness, the wy is easy indeed. But the how is
very tricky, as digital mechanism illustrates.
As Pigliucci illustrates, the why is an easy consequence -- if you
start from the right place and do not confuse things by thinking
only in terms of digital mechanism.
When you work in a theory, better to not go out of it.
"Ah!" exclaim Chalmers, Nagel and others, "You still have not told
us what it is like to be a bat (or a human being, or a zombie), so
there!" ... Of course an explanation isn't the same as an
experience, but that's because the two are completely independent
categories. It is obvious that I cannot experience what it is like
to be you, but I can potentially have a complete explanation of
how and why it is possible to be you.
This shift from consciousness to identity. A complete explanation
of why it is possible to be me, if it exists, makes only
consciousness even more mysterious.
Not at all. The complete neurophysiological account of you and your
brain is "you"
Of course not. That a thrid person description. It is my "3-me", with
some luck, but it is not my 1-me, which is fist person, and not
definable (but still meta-definable, cf Theaetetus []p & p).
-- that is all there is to it. What else does your "Yes, doctor"
thought experiment prove? There is nothing else to account for --
nothing mysterious at all. "To ask for that explanation to also
somehow encompass the experience itself is both incoherent, and an
illegitimate use of the word 'explanation'."
I do not provide an explanation, but a problem, and the start of the
solution. You might some day study it, instead of advertising your
(refuted) theory. Or just tell us that there is some magic in the
brain, because you have been logically shown to invoke that magic, to
escape the conseuqnece of UDA1-8.
See my answer to Clark. The relation first person consciousness
with third person relations is akin to the simpler case of the
relation between equation and surfaces, and then theories and
models, and then machines and private minds.
Then computer science explains this completely up to the matter
appearance or the sigma_1 measure problem.
To ask for that explanation to also somehow encompass the
experience itself is both incoherent, and an illegitimate use of
the word 'explanation'."
Of course. Everybody agree here, but that is not what is done by
the philosopher of mind. We still want an explanation for the
experience, and computer science/mathematical logic provides it (at
least a solid embryo). The point is that it should be precise
enough to get physics, which it does, at the propositional level at
least.
You have missed the point. You are still asking for an "explanation"
when there is nothing remaining to be explained -- incoherent, as
Pigliucci says.
I got it at the propositional level. So I gave a counter-example to
this.
You repeat the dogmatic: we have understand it all, stop asking.
ridiculous, because computer science (mathematical logic) shed a lot
of light here, including the complexity of the task.
He goes on to explain that this does not involve the elimination
of the very concept of consciousness or of the self.
Which are two different notion, and the self is many (the 1-self,
the 3-self, the 1p-plural, etc.).
The problem with this conclusion by people like Churchland and
Dennett is that they are taking reductionism too far -- although
everything is ultimately made of quarks, and the like, obeying the
laws of physics, that does not mean that higher orders of
explanation are illegitimate or eliminable (the old mistake of
positivism!).
Good, but then it became dualist. You need matter and arithmetic, +
a magic link.
Rubbish. No further explanation needed or possible ==> no dualism.
You are the dualist because you invoke the arithmetical realm as
well as the material realm to explain supervenience of consciousness
on the physical brain. To avoid dualism you have to abandon the
arithmetical realm.
You confuse UDA and AUDA. Please read the papers or at least the post.
Concepts such as evolution, consciousness, qualia and so on, have
a definite role, but they are not somehow magical -- to attempt to
'explain' these things in reductionist terms is ultimately, as
Massimo says, a category mistake. ("Where consciousness is
concerned, the existence of the appearance is the reality".)
OK with this, and very well exemplified by computer science and
mathematical logic. But the material ontology just do not work, as
it is an invocation of something never seen to stop pursuing the
explanations. I understand it you want study the sky, but don't
invoke the sky to claim the mind-body problem has been solved.
I don't, I merely invoke the physical workings of the brain. There
is nothing more to it. Material ontology works just fine.
The point is that it does not when we assume computationalism. It
works fine assuming an mind-matter identity link which is not possible
with digital mechanism (alias computationalism). That's the whole UDA
point, although AUDA shows it too, and solve it partially.
You are the one who has to explain how the Material ontology do for
making my consciousness restricted at that material ontology.
You need to show me the necessity of an actual non computable or non
Turing emulable element playing a role in matter and a role in mind
and in the relation between both.
I understand the idea is a bit shocking, but then not much more than
QM itself, and evolution can explain why we are not really made easy
with the counter-intuitive global explanations.
Bruno
Bruce
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