On 28 Jul 2016, at 21:56, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> there are two 3-1 "I",
No idea what "two 3-1 "I" " is and very much doubt
it is worth knowing.
See preceding posts.
> Turing emulable telepathy.
No idea what "Turing emulable telepathy" is and very
much doubt it is worth knowing.
It means that to be in both city *from the 1p view" you need to make
the two brains into one connected machines, but with the given
protocol, that means you need spooky action at a distance.
>>> The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views
from the 1-view pov.
>> Why on earth not?
> Because, by computationalism, the M-guy and the W-guy are
both the H-guy,
Yes, both are the H-guy, but they are not equal to each other.
We agree on this.
> but now living incompatible first person experience.
Obviously if they see different things, like different cities,
then they will have different experiences and diverge, but I'm
talking about the capabilities of the duplicating machine itself
and you said "The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views
from the 1-view pov."
Yes. That follows from computationalism indeed.
And why are they incompatible first person experience?
Because you would need spooky action at a distance. This the preceding
posts for more on this.
Because the duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from
the 1-view pov. And round and round we go, you're assume what
you're trying to prove.
You lost me here.
If computationalism is correct then everything about "you" can be
duplicated as long at the atoms have the correct position and
velocity, not almost everything, not everything except for the 1-
view, EVERYTHING!
Let us imagine you are correct. If everything is duplicated, the whole
computational histories are duplicated. Above you agree that the W-
experience and the M-experience are different, but if the device
duplicates every thing, we should then have two experiences in W and
two experiences in M, but then again. That is not the case, so we get
a contradiction, and you were wrong.
If the machine can't do that then computationalism is wrong,
but you can't just assume computationalism can't do something
(like duplicate the 1-view pov)
The H-1-view is duplicated in the 3-1 picture, but obviously, the M
and W 1-views are not, from the 1-view povs.
and then claim you've proven something about computationalism.
>>>It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture
>> This gets to the very key of the issue! If true then
it's not a people duplicating machine, there is something about
consciousness that no arrangement of atoms can produce
> Very excellent. yes, that's true, and that anticipates step 7.
Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true,
Indeed. It is true. It follows from computationalism, as you just said.
you just assume it's not true ( by assuming "The duplicating machine
never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view pov") and then a few
steps later claim to have proven something.
>> and computationalism is dead wrong.
> Why?
Because if computationalism is right then the duplicating
machine CAN duplicate the 1-view from the 1-view pov, if it
can't then computationalism is wrong. It's as simple as
that.
Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point
of view, with or without computationalism. It just does not make any
sense. The 1-views are indexicals. You can't duplicate a "now" either.
> On the contrary, you just derive this correctly from
computationalism, and "yes" consciousness is not something produced
by any arrangement of atoms.
No, you've derived this not from computationalism but from the
assumption that computationalism is wrong,
?
>> Yesterday in Helsinki the HW-guy couldn't know anything
at all because until H-guy saw Washington the HW-guy didn't
exist.
> Until I see the coin, the head and tail people don't exist
either, and so you are saying that all probabilities never make
sense. It is obviously ridiculous, and so you make my point, by a
reduction of absurdum.
Before the coin toss I can tell you exactly who I want to make a
prediction about the outcome but in your scenario you tell me, if
it's not the Helsinki Man then who on earth is it that you want to
make a prediction before the duplication about what's going to
happen afterward? If it's the Helsinki Man (who else could it be?)
then the correct prediction would be "the copy that sees Moscow will
become the Moscow Man and the copy that sees Washington will become
the Washington Man". What more is there to say? What more is there
to predict?
The unique first person view that the H-guy is about to live. You just
gave again the correct 3-1 view, which shows that there will be two
incompatible first person views, so the question is how to evaluate in
Helsinki the probability of living one or the another, given that
nobody can live two incompatible first person view from the first
person view (the 1-1-view).
Or you need to say: the H-guy died in the process, but then you
contradict the fact on which we have already agreed: we survive
through such duplication (assuming computationalism). In the 1-view,
we survive one and unique, in one city and not in the another as both
copies have always confirmed.
Bruno
John K Clark
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